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Preface
Preface
This book has two parts. The first part talks about general characteristics of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) as well as common steps that have to be taken during the accession process. Theoretical studies 
related to the WTO activities are also presented. Finally, Part I of this book discusses one of the most 
useful methods of examining economic consequences of being WTO member, namely Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) Models. Part II continues analysis and shows application of CGE model to a 
specific case study. It scrutinises accession of Ukraine to the WTO and discusses possible economic 
impact of such step. Concluding remarks for the whole book are given at the end of Part II.             
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Abstract
Abstract 
This research studies the accession of a transition country to the World Trade Organization on the case of 
Ukraine. Quantitative results are obtained by building a Computable General Equilibrium model in the 
mathematical programming language General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). Four scenarios are 
simulated: 1) import tariffs reform; 2) improvement of exports access; 3) improvement of investment 
climate and 4) the scenario that combines previous three, or a full WTO accession.  
The results of the model show that in all scenarios there is growth of both exports and imports. By contrast, 
output and household consumption levels vary from scenario to scenario. The first two simulations, tariff 
reform and improvement of export access, show no significant change in domestic production and 
consumption. Thus, with expanded trade and practically the same output and consumption, Ukraine 
merely becomes more open and shifts to foreign trade. In the third scenario, improvement of investment 
climate has the most favourable results. Owning to better allocation of resources, both domestic 
production and consumption expand and the welfare of households increases by nearly 10% of 
consumption or 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The combined scenario shows a somewhat smaller 
but still significant improvement in welfare: over 8% of consumption or 1.8% of GDP.
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1. Introduction 
Ukraine has a very open economy and the role of the foreign trade sector is extremely important. The ratio of 
exports to GDP in Ukraine is around 60%, much higher than in many other countries. Despite this, Ukraine was 
one of the last large economies in the world that became a World Trade Organization (WTO) member.  
The process of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO system started in 1993, when the official application was 
submitted; later in 1994 a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime of Ukraine was sent to the WTO 
Secretariat. Since that time until the end of 2007 sixteen Working Party meetings were held. Bilateral 
negotiations between Ukraine and WTO members started in 1997, fifty one countries had decided to 
conduct such negotiations; by the end of 2007 all protocols had been signed. In May 2008 Ukraine finally 
became a member of the WTO. 
One possible reason for the slow accession process of Ukraine is the lack of a quantitative assessment of 
gains and losses from WTO membership. This uncertainty only amplifies fears of domestic producers of 
increased competition from abroad and the potential decline of their market share. This study aims to 
contribute to quantifying consequences of WTO membership for Ukraine.  
WTO membership has an impact on all sectors of the economy and whilst modelling it, it is very 
important to capture inter-linkages between various economic agents. One of the most suitable approaches 
for this purpose is to build a Computable General Equilibrium model. This type of models is quite widely 
used for quantifying a variety of economic policy changes including international trade and WTO issues in 
particular and also called Applied General Equilibrium.  
The model employed in this study is based on a standard general equilibrium framework, written in 
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software; it includes 38 sectors of the Ukrainian economy 
and 5 trade regions. Four scenarios are simulated in the model: 1) Change of import tariffs according to 
schedule, agreed with the WTO. 2) Improvement of export access for some industries. Being a WTO 
member, Ukraine should have instruments to curb antidumping and countervailing investigations, thus it 
will be able to increase volume of some exports. 3) Improvement of investment climate, which comes 
from two main sources: First of all, investors face fewer risks and costs of investment, since Ukraine 
should accept more pro-market regulation. Second, cost of capital should diminish along with lower prices 
for imports. This scenario is modelled via the recursive dynamics method. 4) Combined effect. This 
scenario includes decrease of import tariffs, improvement of exports access and improvement of 
investment climate. Scenarios 2, 3 and 4 include 3 sub-scenarios (least favourable; core and optimistic) 
with different rates of market access expansion and investment growth.  
Accession to the WTO: Part I
10 
Introduction
The results of the model show that in all scenarios there is growth of both exports and imports. By contrast, 
output and household consumption levels vary from scenario to scenario. The first two simulations, tariff 
reform and improvement of export access, show no significant change in domestic production and 
consumption. Thus, with expanded trade and practically the same output and consumption, Ukraine merely 
becomes more open and shifts to foreign trade. In the third scenario, improvement of investment climate has 
the most favourable results. Owning to better allocation of resources, both domestic production and 
consumption expand and the welfare of households increases by nearly 10% of consumption or 2% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in the case of the core scenario. The combined scenario shows a somewhat smaller 
but still significant improvement in welfare: over 8% of consumption or 1.8% of GDP. 
This study contributes to existing research in several ways.  
First of all, there is a difference in the approach to modelling. 
The model used in this research is written in the mathematical programming language General Algebraic 
Modelling System as a system of non-linear equations with explicit specification of functions and 
calibration of parameters. At the same time, most Applied General Equilibrium models are written in a 
subsystem for GAMS called Mathematical Programming System for General Equilibrium analysis 
(MPSGE). MPSGE is a library of functions that provides a compact non-algebraic representation of a 
model's nonlinear equations. There is no need to write model-specific functions and calibrate parameters; 
the modeller just has to specify the type of function.  
Although MPSGE makes modelling easier, it has one significant drawback: this method hides the 
theoretical background and economic intuition behind the model and turns it into a “black box”. Thus, 
employing MPSGE may be more suitable for not-so-experienced users (such as policy-makers) or for 
building a model quickly, while explicit modelling of functions allows giving insight into the theory of the 
model and see its connection with its applied economic side. All CGE models known to the author that 
scrutinize accession of post-Soviet countries to the WTO (namely, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan) use 
MPSGE; this model permits the opening of the “black box” of CGE analysis for these countries. 
Next, having a quantitative assessment of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO is useful for economists as 
scientists and for policy-makers in a more applied way.  
Economist may find this research helpful for studying CGE as a branch of economic modelling. There are 
wide concerns about the dependence of CGE models on the specification of parameters, choosing 
functional forms and closure rules. Comparing results of this model with results of other similar models 
and studying differences in model formulation will lead to the shedding of some light on this problem. 
Besides that, this model can be used as a basis for doing further CGE analysis. Scenarios can be changed 
and data rearranged to reflect other policy decisions either related to the WTO or going beyond this topic. 
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This model uses real data for Ukraine and was built with the intention of reflecting the structure of the 
Ukrainian economy as realistically as possible. So, results of the model have practical importance for those 
people who deal with economic policy. For instance, policy-makers can use results to see who is gaining and 
who is loosing from WTO accession and to undertake measures to promote gains and diminish losses.   
Another contribution is a thorough review of existing literature on theoretical aspects of WTO related 
issues. Although there is a large number of empirical studies, theoretical examinations of the WTO are not 
so numerous and well known. To the best of author’s knowledge, there were no previous attempts to 
combine and review such theoretical papers.   
Finally, this research gives comprehensive description of the accession process to the WTO. It portrays 
not only the experience of some transition countries, but also gives deep insight into accession using the 
example of one country - Ukraine. Thus, this research can be seen as a case study for those who are 
interested in the details of accession to the World Trade Organization. 
The study is organized as follows:  
A theoretical and empirical analysis of international trade agreements and GATT/WTO in particular is 
done in Chapter 2. This chapter commences with a general overview of history, main principles and 
agreements of GATT and WTO. Then, the theoretical part starts with explaining the reasons for entering 
an international trade agreement in general and refers to several theoretical studies of this issue. Next, 
specific features of GATT/WTO are scrutinized in theoretical light. It includes such GATT/WTO 
principles as reciprocity, non-discrimination, enforcement, safeguard measures, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures and the potential impact of GATT/WTO on foreign direct investment. The 
chapter continues with an explanation of the accession process to this international organization and the 
accession experience of transition countries. Finally, the accession path of Ukraine is studied by reviewing 
the history of Working Party meetings, goods and services commitments. 
The methodology of the research is explained in Chapter 3. First, the origins and nature of Computable 
General Equilibrium models are studied; this is followed by an overview of the classification of 
Computable General Equilibrium models and their advantages and disadvantages. Computable General 
Equilibrium models were extensively used for studies of trade policy and GATT/WTO in particular. First, 
early studies are overviewed, which cover modelling the different aspects of the Uruguay Round and 
Doha Round. This part is finalized with an examination of the studies devoted to the experience of 
transition economies such as China and some post-USSR countries.  
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Chapter 4 describes the Computable General Equilibrium model, which was built for Ukraine. It starts 
with a description of the macroeconomic state of affairs in Ukraine and also covers such areas as 
composition of industrial production, regional and sectoral breakdown of foreign trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). This part will help the reader to understand why the model was built in a certain way 
and especially the reasoning behind the choice of scenarios. Next, a detailed algebraic formulation of the 
model is given with behavioural equations of all economic agents as well as equations showing calibration 
of certain parameters. This part also includes market clearance equations and the method of calculating the 
welfare of households through equivalent and compensating variation.  Social Accounting Matrix, a 
database for the model, is overviewed next. The meanings of database entries and their sources are given. 
The main assumptions of the model and closure rules are then described. A depiction of four scenarios for 
simulation policy changes in the case of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO concludes this chapter.  
The results of the model are discussed in Chapter 5. Key macroeconomic variables, changes of output and foreign 
trade at sectoral level as well as changes in direction of foreign trade are presented. The results of four scenarios of 
policy changes are analyzed one-by-one with the help of graphical illustration. Finally, the robustness of model is 
checked with the help of sensitivity analyses. This is done by varying key input parameters (elasticities of 
substitution and transformation) and comparing the resulting output values of households’ utility.  
The concluding remarks on the results of the model, along with a comparison of those results with results 
of other models and possible further developments are presented in Chapter 6.        
Accession to the WTO: Part I
13 
Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO
2. Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO 
2.1. Main Features of the WTO 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international body which deals with the rules of trade between 
nations. Established on January 1, 1995, as a result of the Uruguay Round, the WTO replaced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a legal and institutional organization. The GATT was a 
multilateral agreement which has governed international trade since 1947 till creation of the WTO.  
The World Trade Organization follows the core principles of the GATT, which include (WTO, 2005):  
 Non-discrimination in trade; 
 Free trade; 
 Transparency and predictability; 
 Assistance and trade concessions to developing countries. 
The WTO addresses several new important issues which were not covered by the GATT: 
 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
 Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs); 
 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); 
 Dispute Settlement; 
 Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
As of the end of 2007 the WTO included 151 members, and 30 countries had the status of observers and 
were seeking membership. Its headquarters are situated in Geneva, Switzerland, there are over 600 
secretariat staff, and the budget for 2007 was 182 million Swiss francs. 
History 
The idea of creating an organization to deal with international trade was dictated by desire to overcome the 
backlashes of the protectionist policy of the 1930s, which is believed to have been a significant cause of the Great 
Depression, and to boost world economy after World War II. Initially, it was driven forward predominantly by 
American and British efforts. Such an organization was expected to handle questions of international commerce 
and join the two “Bretton Woods” institutions: the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
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In 1946 the United Nations Economic and Social Council called for the establishment of an International Trade 
Organization (ITO) during the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Havana, Cuba, in 1947. The 
concept of the ITO was very ambitious and included issues of trade in goods, services, regulation of investment 
and employment. At the same time, 23 participating countries were working on tariff negotiations. In the autumn 
of 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed, containing 45 000 tariff concessions and 
covering one fifth of world trade. Plans for the ITO were abandoned, mainly because of the refusal of US 
Congress to ratify the Havana Charter. Thus, the GATT was a treaty without the intended administrative 
organization and covered only part of its original scope (Suranovic et al., 1998).    
The basic legal text of the GATT remained much the same as it was in 1947, but it was extended by 
plurilateral agreements, special arrangements, interpretations, and voluntary agreements to decrease tariffs. 
For the most part negotiations were conducted within the framework of so-called “trade rounds” – 
multilateral talks. Since 1947 there have been eight trade rounds their basic features are listed in Table 2.1. 
Year Place/Name Subjects covered Countries
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 
1956 Geneva Tariffs 26 
1960-
1961 
Geneva  
(Dillon Round) 
Tariffs 26 
1964-
1967 
Geneva  
(Kennedy Round) 
Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62 
1973-
1979 
Geneva  
(Tokyo Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, framework 
agreements 
102
1986-
1994 
Geneva  
(Uruguay Round) 
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, 
intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, creation of the WTO, etc 
123  
2001- Doha Launching of a new round of trade talks  
Table 2.1 Trade Rounds of GATT/WTO  
Source: WTO Secretariat 
Until the Kennedy Round in 1964-1967, the discussion was mostly around a further decrease of import 
tariffs in the form of bilateral negotiations. The Kennedy Round brought up approximately 50 per cent 
decrease of tariffs by major industrialized countries, inclusion of new industries in liberalization and a 
new GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
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In addition to a significant reduction of tariffs, the Tokyo Round produced new important agreements, including 
those on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, Import Licensing Procedures, 
Custom Valuation, Government Procurement, Bovine Meat Arrangement and Trade in Civil Aircraft. 
The Uruguay Round was announced in September 1986 and lasted more than seven years. It was by far 
the most ambitious trade round and included virtually every aspect of trade policy. Traditionally, the 
GATT had dealt with trade in goods, but in the Uruguay Round it was proposed that it should extend to 
new areas, such as trade in services and intellectual property rights.  
By 1998 negotiations had reached the stage of the “Mid-Term-Review” at the Ministerial Meeting in Montreal, 
Canada. Ministers had assessed a progress of trade talks and agreed on several issues, including market access for 
tropical products, a Dispute Settlement Body and Trade Policy Review Mechanism. During the next Ministerial 
Meeting in Brussels in 1990, disagreements on how to proceed with agriculture reform (especially between the 
USA and European Community) led to a decision to extend the Round. During the following two years, 
participants in the talks deepened the discussion of demanding topics, including creation of a new organization. In 
1992, the USA and European Community settled their disagreements over agricultural policy.  
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It took until the end of 1993 to resolve remaining issues and conclude negotiations on market access for 
goods and services. On April 15, 1994, most of the ministers from the 123 participating countries signed 
the draft charter of the WTO. On January 1, 1995, the WTO came into being. Whereas the GATT was a 
provisional multilateral agreement, covering trade in goods only, the WTO became a formal international 
organization and, besides GATT, included much broader issues, such as trade in services, intellectual 
property, Dispute Settlement, and a Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
The WTO keeps advancing trade negotiations. The most significant agenda so far was launched at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. It concerns a wide range of issues, especially those 
of importance for developing countries, and is called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA).  
Principles  
The WTO has several important principles, lying at the heart of a free trading system: non-discrimination in trade, 
free trade, transparency and predictability, assistance and trade concessions for developing countries. 
Non-discrimination in trade takes the form of two principles: the Most Favoured Nation and the 
National Treatment 
Most Favoured Nation principle outlaws discrimination between goods, imported from different trade 
partners. According to it, “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties”1. Thus, if a country grants someone special treatment, for instance lower import tariffs, it must do 
the same for all other members. Besides stating the MFN principle in Article I of GATT, it is also written 
in Article II of GATS and Article IV of TRIPS, but with some differences.  
National Treatment requires that once goods have entered the market, they must be treated no worse than 
domestically produced goods. Like the MFN principle, National Treatment applies to goods, services and 
intellectual property.  
Free trade. WTO regards the liberalization of trade and reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers as important 
conditions for promoting a sustainable development. Countries who wish to participate in the WTO framework 
should make a commitment, directed at providing greater market access to other members.  
Transparency and predictability. The transparency principle obliges countries to inform the WTO and 
its members about policies and regulations within respective countries, especially about those concerning 
trade. Predictability implies that members should commit not to raise tariffs above the binding level, 
unless they are ready to compensate for such an increase.    
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Assistance and trade concessions to developing countries. Developing countries comprise two thirds of all 
WTO members and usually assume the same obligations as developed economies. Nevertheless, WTO 
regulations foresee more flexibility for developing countries, called Special and Differential (S&D) treatment 
provisions. S&D includes more time for transition, concessions from developed countries, and technical 
assistance.  
Functions and organization 
As stated in Article III of Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO, the main functions of the 
World Trade Organization are the following (GATT (1), 1994): 
1. The WTO shall facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the 
objectives of the WTO agreements.  
2. The WTO shall provide the forum for negotiations among its Members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations.  
3. The WTO shall administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes.  
4. The WTO shall administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  
5. With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall 
cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.  
Decisions in the WTO are taken by member governments, either by ministers or by their delegates. The 
WTO agreements are usually reached by consensus, but in some cases voting is allowed as well.  
The highest authority of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which takes place at least once every two 
years and can reach decisions on all matters. At the second level, day-to-day work is done by the General 
Council, which can meet as the General Council itself as the Dispute Settlement Body and as the Trade 
Policy Review Body. At the third level, three more councils report to the General Council: the Council for 
Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights.  Besides that, there are various committees, working parties, working groups, 
who report either to the General Council or to the Councils for Trade in Goods, Services or TRIPS.     
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Agreements 
The legal texts of the WTO are a compound of more then 60 agreements, annexes, decisions and 
understandings. The majority of these are the result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Agreements can be classified into six categories: an umbrella agreement, establishing the 
WTO; agreements for trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights; dispute settlement; reviews 
of trade policies (see Table 2.2). Agreements on goods and services include basic principles, additional 
agreements and market access commitments made by individual countries. 
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Umbrella Agreement Establishing WTO 
Goods Services 
Intellectual 
Property 
Basic 
principles 
GATT GATS TRIPS 
Additional 
agreements 
 Agriculture 
 Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 
 Textiles and clothing 
 Technical Barriers to Trade 
 Trade-Related Investment 
Measures 
 Anti-dumping measures 
 Customs valuation methods 
 Preshipment inspection 
 Rules of Origin 
 Import Licensing Procedures 
 Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
 Safeguards 
 Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons Supplying Services 
 Annex on Air Transport services 
 Annexes on Financial Services 
 Annex on Negotiations on 
Maritime Transport Services 
 Annex on Negotiations on Basic 
Telecommunications 
Market 
access 
commitments 
Countries’ schedules of 
commitments 
Countries’ schedules of commitments; 
MFN exemptions 
Dispute 
settlement 
Dispute Settlement 
Transparency Trade Policy Review 
Table 2.2 Agreements of the WTO 
Source: WTO and Bacchetta, 2003 
A brief description of these agreements is as follows:  
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).    
The Uruguay Round resulted in new commitments to cut and bind tariffs in the framework of the GATT. 
Thus, developed countries increased the number of imports with “bound” tariffs to 99%, and countries in 
transition to 98% (WTO, 2005).  
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The Agriculture Agreement envisages changes in rules concerning market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies. Market access rules require transition from quotas to tariffs only. Domestic support to agriculture is 
divided into three categories. “Green box”: measures which can be freely used (for instance research, 
infrastructure development). “Blue box”: support on a small scale: no more than 5% of total agriculture 
production for developed countries and 10% for developing (measures to limit production, rural development in 
developing countries). “Amber box”: direct support of production and exports; these measures have to be cut. 
Export subsidies are prohibited, unless the subsidies are specified in a member’s list of commitments. 
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement sets out the basic rules for food, animal and 
plant safety and encourages countries to apply international standards. 
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) gradually takes textiles to the general regulations of 
GATT by removing quotas. 
The Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement give the legal 
definition of dumping and subsidies, and allow countries to take actions against them. 
The Safeguards Agreement foresees cases when domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury 
caused by a surge of imports, and allows restriction of such imports for a certain period.  
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The importance of services in international trade has grown enormously and accounts for one fifth of total 
international trade. The GATS is the first and only agreement regulating international trade in services. 
GATS functions according to the same principles as trade in goods: MFN treatment, national treatment 
and commitments on market access. The GATS annexes cover trade in four types of services: movement 
of natural persons, financial services, telecommunications and air transport services. 
Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
TRIPS cover five issues: 1) how to apply the basic principles of free trade to TRIPS; 2) how to protect 
intellectual property rights (copyrights, trademarks, geographical indicators, industrial designs, and 
patents); 3) how to enforce this protection; 4) how to settle disputes and 5) special transitional 
arrangements to adjust to TRIPS rules. 
Dispute Settlement. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) includes rules and procedures that allow the handling of 
trade disputes between countries. It is managed by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) consisting of all 
WTO members. DSU sets clear time frames for the dispute settlement process and establishes an appeal 
system. Dispute settlement includes a consultation phase, setting up the panel, delivering several reports 
on the case and possibly an appeal. The maximum time to view a dispute is equal to one year or one year 
and three months, in case of appeal.    
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Over 47 years of the GATT, only 200 cases have been disputed, while during 1995-2006 more than 350 
cases were considered. The increased number of disputes is believed to be attributed to an expansion of 
the world trade and a growing faith in the WTO system (WTO, 2005). The majority of cases did not reach 
the full panel process, but were settled “out of court”. Agriculture was the most frequent industry to evoke 
a dispute, followed by textiles, alcoholic beverages, and chemical industries. The majority of cases were 
brought by developed countries against other developed countries; the next group is developed countries 
against developing countries (Horn et al., 2006).     
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
This mechanism is designed to increase the transparency of countries’ trade policy by regularly 
monitoring them. This is achieved in two ways: governments have to inform the WTO about its trade 
policies and regulations; and the WTO conducts regular trade policy reviews of individual countries. 
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2.2. Theory of Trade Agreements and GATT/WTO 
Reasons for entering international trade agreements 
This section will deal with the theoretical grounds of international trade agreements and GATT/WTO in 
particular. First, the motives for setting import tariffs will be considered. Second, the inefficiency of the 
unilateral trade policy will be discussed as well as how this inefficiency can be eliminated through trade 
agreement in its general form. Next, the debate will move specifically to GATT/WTO and how its core 
virtues can improve efficiency. The theoretical justification of such mechanisms as reciprocal tariff 
negotiations, Most Favoured Nations principle, enforcement through Dispute Settlement Procedure and 
safeguard, as well as antidumping and countervailing measures, will be reviewed. 
Although economic theory suggests that free trade maximizes welfare, countries do set import tariffs, 
being ruled by several reasons. One of them, widely discussed by trade economists, is a terms of trade 
argument. It states that large countries which can influence world prices can gain by setting an import 
tariff, thus lowering the price of imports. Although such policy also distorts production and consumption, 
benefits can outscore losses if an optimal import tariff is introduced. This theory was first analyzed by 
Torrens (1833) and Mill (1844) and developed further by Edgeworth (1894), Bickerdike (1907), Johnson 
(1953-1954). The concept is important for further analysis and will be discussed later in this chapter.  
Another set of arguments was formalized by Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster in 1957, and received 
the name “theory of the second best”. It shows what will happen if optimal conditions are not satisfied in 
an economic model. If a domestic economy has some market failures, the government may need to 
intervene. In the particular case of international trade, this means deviation from free trade. 
The influence of special interests groups on politics is yet another explanation for setting tariffs. As 
suggested by Mayer (1984) “political decisions on tariff rates are reflections of the selfish economic 
interests of voters, lobbying groups, politicians, or other decision makers in trade policy matters”. Magee 
(1989), Hillman and Ursprung (1988) model the process of tariff formation as a political competition 
among parties. Competing parties propose their tariffs and interests groups choose which party to support. 
Stigler (1971), Grossman and Helpman (1984) argue that parties set their policies in order to maximize 
their political support from different lobbies. Downs (1957), Mayer (1981) and others assume that parties 
try to meet the preferences of voters. They presume that different levels of tariffs favour different types of 
voters, depending on their occupation. Thus, political parties will set tariffs which will satisfy a median 
voter.
The terms of trade arguments for imposing tariffs are considered below for the cases of small and large 
economies.  
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Relatively easy and unambiguous is the case of a small open country. Imposition of import tariffs does not 
affect terms of trade, since the country is a price taker. Without tariffs, a country is able to trade more and 
improve its welfare. Thus, there is no advantage in setting an import tariffs. The intuition behind the effect 
of import tariffs is illustrated in Figure 2.1. There are two goods that are produced and consumed in every 
country: X  and Y . The production possibility frontier is ''YX . WP  are relative world prices and TP  are 
relative domestic prices, including tariffs. In the absence of tariffs production occurs at point A  at the 
intersection of world prices and production possibility frontier. Consumption is at point C , where the 
consumers’ indifference curve is tangent to the world prices. Good X  is imported and good Y  is 
exported, resulting in foreign trade represented by triangle AEC . If an import tariff is imposed on good 
X , consumers and producers face relative prices TP . Production is moved to point B , consumption to 
D  and foreign trade diminishes to BFD , resulting in a lower welfare level. 
'X
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Figure 2.1 Impact of an Import Tariff, Small Country 
Source: Whalley (1985) 
Analysis becomes more complicated if a country has influence on world prices – large country assumption. 
The theoretical backgrounds in this area were founded in the first half of the nineteenth century. Torrens 
(1833) and Mill (1844) argued that although countries will loose from diminished trade if import tariffs 
are imposed, they can also win if foreign countries lower prices in an attempt to secure market presence. 
Edgeworth (1894) and Bickerdike (1907) developed this theory further at the edge of the twentieth century. 
Edgeworth (1894) used offer curves for his analysis, and argued that if the offer curve of foreign country 
is not perfectly elastic, the domestic country can improve its welfare. Bickerdike (1907) developed a 
formula, relating an optimal tariff that maximizes welfare with export supply elasticity. The concept, 
stating that it is possible to conduct trade on more favourable terms by introducing an optimal tariff – the 
level of protection that maximizes domestic welfare taking into account the foreign offer curve - has 
acquired the name “optimal tariff theory”. 
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The offer curves diagram, developed by Edgeworth, is a useful tool to demonstrate the logic of optimal 
tariff theory and is widely used in trade agreements analysis. There are two countries and two goods. In 
Figure 2.2 (adopted from Whalley, 1985) X  are home country exports (foreign country imports) and Y
are home country imports (foreign country exports). Offer curves are determined by tangencies between 
relative price lines and trade indifference curves (a combination of imports and exports between which 
consumers are indifferent). In the absence of a tariff, the initial relative price line is denoted as WNTP  ; offer 
curves of home and foreign countries are HNTOC  and 
FO  respectively2. Trade initially occurs at point A ,
where relative world prices and offer curves of both countries intersect. The graph also shows the initial 
trade indifference curve of the home country HNTIC .
The introduction of a tariff will change relative world prices and price line, and the home country offer 
curve will rotate leftward to WWTP  and 
H
WTOC  respectively. Now trade will take place at point B  and a 
higher domestic indifference curve HWTIC  will be achieved.  
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Figure 2.2 Impact of an Import Tariff, Large Country
Source: Whalley (1985) 
The analysis above assumed that the foreign country will not retaliate in response to the introduction of a 
tariff. Kaldor (1940) brought into discussion the possibility of retaliation from the exploited country. He 
argued that a country which can change terms of trade is acting like a monopoly, and the magnitude of 
possible change depends on the monopoly power of such a country, i.e. the elasticity of foreign demand. 
As he puts it: “Provided that the elasticity of foreign demand is less than infinite there is always some rate 
of duty which it is advantageous to introduce in the absence of retaliation; and if the elasticity of the 
country’s own demand for foreign products is markedly higher than the elasticity of foreign demand for its 
own products – an unusual case – this policy may be advantageous even if the “optimum degree of 
retaliation” of foreign countries is allowed for.”   
Johnson (1953-1954) in his now classical work “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation” significantly 
developed the optimal tariff theory scrutinizing a two-good two-country general equilibrium model. He 
criticized Kaldor’s study for being “imprecise and almost meaningless” and proposed relating the optimal 
tariff to the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. The author shows that optimal home country tariff t
should be set at the level 1 ft  , where f  is the elasticity of the foreign offer curve. As was 
argued by Whalley (1985), since trade elasticities tend to be low, a high optimal tariff is implied.  
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More recent examinations of trade agreements going in line with the optimal tariff argument include those 
of Mayer (1981), Dixit (1987), Staiger(1994), Grossman and Helpman (2002). Etheir (2006) criticizes 
such studies for their incompleteness. According to him, trade agreements do not prevent countries from 
influencing terms of trade; phenomena, which he denotes as the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle. Although 
countries have bound import tariffs, they have not bound export taxes and still have some market power. The 
model he uses is two countries, two factors and three traded goods and includes political economy, which 
allows lobbies to support the trade policy they prefer. Ethier concludes that trade agreements do not prevent 
countries from changing their terms of trade on the export side and should also address export taxes. 
Thus, if the optimal tariff theory holds true, certain countries can get better-off by imposing import tariffs 
and changing terms of trade. However, to realize their trade policy, countries have to interrelate between 
each other. The next section will examine the interactions between different countries and unilateral 
versus multilateral trade policy.  
In the case of both countries imposing tariffs, equilibrium is set at point C , shown in Figure 2.3. If 
countries decide to move to free trade, new equilibrium is reached at point A  with higher indifference 
curves HNTIC  for the home country and 
F
NTIC  for the foreign one. If one country decides to abolish the 
tariffs, then, as was shown above, another country has incentives to keep the tariff effective and improve 
its terms of trade. In this case equilibrium is reached at point D , where the home country is worse off and 
the foreign country is better off. Likewise, if the foreign country cancels the tariffs, the home country will 
keep them, and at equilibrium point B  the foreign country will be worse off and the home country better 
off.
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Figure 2.3 Unilateral Versus Multilateral Trade Policy
Source: Whalley (1985) 
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Thus, countries are trapped in a “Prisoners Dilemma”, illustrated in Table 2.3. Both countries would be 
better off by choosing free trade (shown by payoffs 10 and 10). But knowing that unilateral abolishment 
of import tariffs will damage the home country (payoff -10) and make the foreign country better off 
(payoff 20), both countries move to protection, which brings losses to everyone (payoffs -5 and -5).   
Country 1 / Country 2 Free Trade Protection 
Free Trade (10; 10) (-10; 20) 
Protection (20; -10) (-5; -5) 
Table 2.3 Prisoners Dilemma of Unilateral Trade Policy  
Source: Bacchetta (2003) 
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As was argued in many studies, and discussed below, if unilateral trade policy does not allow the 
establishment of free trade while protection policy is not optimal, trade agreements between countries can 
foster free trade and make the participants better off. Before proceeding with a discussion, a definition of 
“trade agreement” is necessary. Staiger (1994) defines an “international trade agreement as a collection of 
rules regarding the conduct of trade policy to which compliance requires some form of enforcement 
mechanism, that is, where unilateral incentives to violate the rules of the agreement are kept in check by 
the desire to avoid punishments that are themselves specified in the agreement”. 
Bagwell and Staiger in a number of studies (Bagwell and Staiger (1990), (1996), (1999), (2003)) developed a 
theoretical framework for the investigation of international trade agreements, specifically in the context of the 
GATT/WTO framework. A review of the trade agreement theory will be concentrated around their work.   
To illuminate the inefficiency of a unilateral trade policy and possible remedies given by a trade 
agreement, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) developed a standard general equilibrium model with two 
countries and two sectors. Home and foreign countries (the latter is denoted with an asterisk) trade by 
goods x  and y . Goods are normal and there is a perfect competition. Imports of home (foreign) country 
are respectively )(yx ; then yx ppp   (   yx ppp ) are local relative prices, faced by home (foreign) 
producers and consumers. The home (foreign) add valorem import tariff is defined as )( tt . Letting 
)1( t  and )1(   t , the relation between prices becomes:   ww pppp ,   and 
 ww pppp ,   , where  yxw ppp   is the “world” relative price. Terms of trade for the home 
(foreign) country are given by )1( ww pp .
Production is determined at a point on the production possibilities frontier where the marginal rate of 
transformation between x  and y  is equal to the local relative price. Domestic and foreign production 
functions are determined as  pQQ ii   and    pQQ ii  for  yxi , . Consumption is also a function 
of local relative prices as well as of tariff revenue  RR , which is distributed to domestic (foreign) 
consumers. Thus, domestic and foreign consumption is  RpDD ii ,  and    RpDD ii ,  for 
 yxi ,  respectively. Tariff revenue can be expressed as the amount of imports times difference 
between domestic and world prices:       wxx pppQRpDR  ,   for home country and 
      wyy pppQRpDR 11,    for foreign country, alternately  wppRR ,  and 
 wppRR ,  . Now, consumption in each country can be written as     wiwi ppRpDppC ,,, 
and     wiwi ppRpDppC ,,,    for  yxi , .
Imports of home country are represented as      pQppCppM xwxwx  ,, , and exports as 
     wyywy ppCpQppE ,,  . For foreign countries these trade flows are denoted as  wy ppM ,
and  wx ppE , .
Accession to the WTO: Part I
29 
Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO
Home and foreign country budget constraints require balanced trade and correspond to the following two 
equations:  
   wywxw ppEppMp ,,       (2.1) 
   wxwwy ppEpppM ,,      (2.2) 
The local price depends upon the tariff and world price; the equilibrium world price    ,~ wp  is 
determined by the market-clearing condition for good y :
     wwywwy pppMpppE ~,~,~,~,      (2.3) 
To sum up, the tariffs and market equilibrium condition (2.3) determine the world price. Next, the 
equilibrium world price and tariffs determine local prices. Finally, world and local prices determine 
production, consumption, trade volumes and tariff revenues. 
There are two major approaches to represent the government welfare function. The traditional one states 
that the government maximizes national income and, thus, welfare is improved when terms of trade are 
improved. This approach was formalized by Edgeworth (1894), Bickerdike (1907), Johnson (1953-1954), 
Dixit (1987), Mayer (1981). A political-economy approach takes into account distribution of welfare and 
was analyzed by Feenstra and Bhagwatti (1982) and Mayer (1984). The last formulated a model in which 
the government defends the interests of a medium voter. 
In their work, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) encompass both traditional and political economy methods. In 
order to do so, they do not represent payoffs directly in terms of tariffs, but rather in terms of local and 
world prices, induced by tariffs. Thus, the welfare functions of home and foreign government are 
 wppW ~,  and  wppW ~, .
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) do not impose restrictions on government preferences over local prices in 
order to allow different sets of political motivation. Indeed, an important assumption they make is that the 
government will increase welfare if terms of trade improve:  
  0~/~,  ww pppW  and   0~/~,   ww pppW    (2.4) 
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This point can be demonstrated using Figure 2.4. 
1
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 Cp
 Ap
 Ap
 Cp
B
A
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
Figure 2.4 The World and Local Price Effect of a Tariff Change 
Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
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Initial tariff pair is represented as point    ,A , which is formed at the intersection of the domestic 
iso-local-price locus    ApAp   and an iso-world-price locus    ApAp ww ~~  . Following an 
increase in domestic tariff, a new point    ,1C  is achieved. This point is associated with a second 
pair of prices, corresponding to domestic iso-local-price locus    CpCp   and an iso-world-price 
locus    CpCp ww ~~  . At point C  the world price is lower than at point A , reflecting improved market 
access for the home country. 
Next, Bagwell and Staiger (2003) determine the unilateral trade policies of governments and show what 
kind of problem arises in the absence of a trade agreement. Each government sets its tariff policy in order 
to maximize its welfare, and taking the tariff policy of trade partners as given. Thus, reaction functions are 
implicitly defined as:          
    0/~/ ~   wpp pWddpW w    (2.5) 
    0/~/ ~     wpp pWddpW   (2.6) 
Let     0///~   ddpp w  and     0///~    ddpp w . Than, (2.5) and (2.6) can be  
rewritten as  
0~  wpp WW     (2.7) 
0~   pp WW   (2.8) 
As can be seen, the best-response tariff of each government includes induced local and world price 
movements. Figure 2.4 gives further insight. Suppose the home government unilaterally increases the 
tariff, moving from point    ,A  to    ,1C . The new tariff pair 1 and   results in higher local 
and lower world prices, compared with point A . This move can be broken into two stages: movement 
from A  to B  shows the effect of change in the world price and the corresponding change in welfare is 
represented in (2.7) by wpW~ . Movement from B  to C  holds the world price fixed and isolates change 
in local price; welfare is given by term pW .
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The authors argue that change from B  to C  is domestic in nature and reflects the balance between the 
cost of economic distortions in production and consumption and benefit of political support. The change 
from A  to B  has indeed international character: it captures the improvement of domestic terms of trade 
and the corresponding deterioration of foreign terms of trade, thus shifting costs of trade policy to the 
foreign government. In a Nash equilibrium, both governments are on their reaction curves and the Nash 
equilibrium pair of tariffs  NN  ,  satisfies (2.7) and (2.8). 
Next, the authors make several observations; formal proof is given in their previous work on the theory of 
GATT (Bagwell and Staiger (1999)). 
1. The Nash equilibrium is inefficient. If a government sets its trade policy unilaterally, it has 
incentives to shift the costs of such a policy to a foreign government. This results in too high 
tariffs and too low trade. 
2. Both governments can achieve efficiency improvements relative to the Nash equilibrium only if 
they both agree to lower tariffs below the Nash equilibrium level. Otherwise they get stuck in the 
Prisoners Dilemma.  
3. If governments do not try to shift costs to foreign partners and rather consider domestic costs and 
benefits, the resulting politically optimal tariffs are efficient.  
These observations are illustrated in Figure 2.5. First, non-cooperative governments set their tariffs at 
point N . As was originally shown by Johnson (1953-1954), this is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of 
a tariff retaliation and counter-retaliation game. This point is inefficient, since the home and foreign iso-
welfare contours are not tangent. As Johnson (1953-1954) argues, neither country could improve its 
welfare with a unilateral process, but both countries can be better off if they pursue a mutual tariff 
reduction. 
Mayer (1981) points out that efficient tariffs would have to satisfy condition   1 . Such tariffs make 
local prices across countries equal and achieve world-wide economic efficiency. Besides free trade 
between the countries ( 1  ), there is an entire set of efficient tariff pairs, which lies on the 
efficiency locus (curve EE  ). The portion of this locus, denoted ee  , is a contract curve: a 
combination of tariffs that are efficient and bring welfare, greater than Nash welfare. Second, the Nash 
iso-welfare curves imply that greater than Nash equilibrium welfare can be achieved only if both 
governments can agree on a reduction of tariffs. Finally, politically optimal tariffs are at point PO , which 
lies on the efficiency locus.   
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Figure 2.5 The Purpose of Trade Agreement
Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
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Next, a discussion of how such an international trade agreement as GATT/WTO can eliminate the 
inefficiency of a unilateral trade policy follows. The review will start from the main pillars of 
GATT/WTO, namely reciprocity of negotiations and non-discrimination; next, it will move to 
enforcement, safeguard mechanisms, and antidumping and countervailing measures. 
Reciprocity 
Using the model discussed above and developing their previous work (Bagwell and Staiger (1999)), 
Bagwell and Staiger (2003) argue that trade agreement, in particular in context of GATT/WTO framework 
can give remedy to inefficiency of unilateral trade policy through mechanism of reciprocity. According to 
the Preamble of GATT, “reciprocal and mutually advantage arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade” should serve the main goals of GATT/WTO. This rule is 
confirmed in practice, as governments try to achieve a balance of concessions during negotiations.  
First, concept of reciprocity is formalized. Let’s suppose that initial tariffs  00 ,   are changed to a 
newly negotiated pair  11,  . Initial world and domestic prices are denoted as   000 ,~~  ww pp  and 
 000 ~, wppp  ; succeeding prices are  111 ,~~  ww pp  and  111 ~, wppp  . Principle of reciprocity 
holds if tariff changes allow following:  
         001100110 ~,~,~,~,~ wywywxwxw ppEppEppMppMp     (2.9) 
Next, using trade balance condition (3.1) authors characterize reciprocity. Given balanced trade at initial 
tariffs, equation    00000 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp   should be true; thus, (2.9) may be rewritten as  
   11110 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp 
Consequently, balanced trade implies    11111 ~,~,~ wywxw ppEppMp  . Taking this into account, (2.9) 
may be further rewritten as 
    0~,~~ 1101  wxww ppMpp  (2.10) 
Accession to the WTO: Part I
35 
Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO
This equation states that mutual changes in trade policy obey the rule of reciprocity if and only if world 
prices are unchanged. As was stated previously, governments can increase welfare by changing tariffs and 
passing costs to foreign state. This policy is inefficient and requires change of world price. Next, authors 
show how obeying reciprocity principle can increase mutual welfare without changing world price. At the 
Nash equilibrium point from equations (2.4), (2.7) and (2.8) follows that  pp WW 0 . If governments 
decide to reduce tariffs in reciprocal way, than local price p  would fall and foreign price p  would rise; 
thus, domestic welfare would rise (since 0pW ) together with foreign welfare (since 0pW ). In other 
words, at the Nash equilibrium governments would like to increase trade if it does not require loss of 
terms of trade. Unilateral policy does not allow for this, so neither government would lower tariffs. But if 
tariffs are decreased reciprocally and decrease of tariffs in one country is balanced by decrease in other, 
terms of trade remain constant. Each government can increase welfare by expanding trade without terms 
of trade loss. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the central idea of Bagwell and Staiger (2003) arguments.  
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Figure 2.6 Reciprocal Trade Negotiations 
  Source: Bagwell and Staiger (2003) 
The iso-world-price locus runs through the Nash point N as well as politically optimal point PO . If 
governments start trade negotiations, which result in reciprocal tariff decrease, they can move down the 
iso-world-price locus and experience welfare gains. Reaching politically optimum, they have no 
incentives for further negotiations. 
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Non-discrimination  
The other pillar of GATT/WTO is the rule of non-discrimination, which takes the form of the Most 
Favoured Nation principle.  
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) use a model similar to the one described above for reciprocity, but in multi-
country settings. They show that politically optimal tariffs will be efficient if and only if they conform to 
the principle of non-discrimination. Otherwise countries will be seeking for imports which come from the 
country on which the higher import tariffs are placed. But, as was shown earlier, this policy leads to 
shifting costs abroad and is not efficient. 
Another important feature of the MFN principle is giving more equal opportunities in trade negotiations to 
small economies vis-à-vis rich countries. Caplin and Krishna (1988) developed a three-country dynamic 
bargaining model and suggest that MFN has an important effect on equal distribution of bargaining power 
across countries. Ludema (1991) also investigates the three-country bargaining game and reaches the 
conclusion that bargaining under MFN will result in a Pareto efficient trade agreement. Moreover, he finds 
that all countries gain from negotiations under the MFN principle, but not necessarily in its absence.       
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Negative processes associated with the MFN principle are also studied. Rubinstein (1982) and Caplin and 
Krishna (1988) point out that the “free riding” of one country on the reciprocal agreements of others may 
bring some costs. The latter two authors employ a static model of simultaneous bargaining, and argue that 
the MFN principle requires the lowering of tariffs to all countries, not only those involved in bargaining. 
In this situation, a simultaneous round of bargains under the MFN rule may result in higher tariffs, 
compared with the scenario when MFN is not applied. Ludema (1991), who uses the three-country non-
cooperative dynamic bargaining model, arrives at a different conclusion. In his model, one country makes 
a proposal to the other two and they are free to accept or reject it. If both countries accept the offer, 
bargaining is over and an agreement is concluded; if both reject, then the negotiations are repeated. If one 
country accepts and the other rejects, the accepting country can reconsider its decision. Ludema argues 
that, in the latter case, the accepting country has incentives to change its decision and continue bargaining. 
Under this dynamic set of bargaining games countries will be bargaining until Pareto-efficient MFN tariffs 
are achieved and the “free rider” problem does not bring substantial costs.      
Enforcement 
Even if trade agreement has been achieved, individual countries have incentives to cheat on such 
agreements by raising tariffs and shifting costs to trade partners. Therefore, an enforcement mechanism 
should be established and should support existing international trade agreements, thus allowing escape 
from the Prisoners Dilemma. GATT/WTO established the Dispute Settlement System for this purpose. 
Bagwell and Staiger (2000) model mechanism of Dispute Settlement System through infinitely-repeated 
tariff game of tariff formation. If deviation from the common tariff occurs, a retaliatory trade war starts. 
They conclude that enforcement should achieve and maintain a balance between short-term temptation to 
deviate from the agreed tariffs and enjoy a term of trade benefits from one side, and the long-term costs of 
future loss of cooperation from the other.    
Maggi (1999) examined the role of the GATT/WTO in international trade cooperation and built a multi-
country model in which governments repeatedly select import barriers. The author recognizes the further 
benefit of a dispute settlement mechanism, which occurs from aggregation of enforcement power. If 
governments join a multilateral enforcement mechanism, the combined punishment for deviating from a 
trade agreement will be much more serious and will prevent cheating.     
Besides that, a dispute settlement may play an important role in gathering and disseminating information. 
Hungerford (1991) built a two-country model, and argued that although information gathering is costly, it 
allows the avoiding of even more costly trade wars. He argued that the “after” information on a certain 
case shows if there was a deviation from the agreement or not. Countries have incentives to start 
retaliation only if departure from an agreement is detected.  
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Kovenoch and Thursby (1992) showed that countries directly affected by deviation from a trade 
agreement facilitate monitoring and strengthen cooperation. They also argued that the very existence of a 
reliable dispute settlement system helps countries feel the obligations of a trade agreement and reduce 
incentives to step away from it. 
Bown (2002) compared the dispute settlement process with safeguard measures. He argued that if 
countries need to deviate from a trade agreement, they may choose either a “legal” path – safeguard 
measures or an “illegal” one by unilaterally breaking an agreement and facing dispute settlement. The 
author showed that the WTO has high incentives to keep to “legal” behaviour, and only countries with a 
high potential to benefit from terms of trade change will choose an “illegal” option. Also, Bown (2002) 
noted more efficient dispute settlement rules under the WTO than under GATT.    
Safeguard measures 
Although being a part of an international trade agreement, countries may need to step away from free 
trade and apply higher protection to avoid domestic industry being seriously injured. The GATT/WTO 
envisaged such occasions and put in Safeguard measures, providing set of rules to avoid maltreatment of 
higher protection. Several studies concerned areas where laws regulating safeguard measures may be of 
hand: application of special protection too frequently and for too long a time. 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990) followed the work of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and showed that a weak 
international enforcement mechanism can lead to special protection when trade volumes decrease and 
governments have incentives to violate tariff bindings. Matsuyama (1990) and Mayer (1994) point out that 
if rules are not strong enough, special protection is likely to be over-utilized compared with a 
government’s optimal plan. Both authors argue that GATT rules can enforce commitment to adhere to the 
optimal plan.  
Matsuyama (1990) investigated the possibility of transferring a temporary protection to a prolonged one. 
In his model, the structure of the game between government and firms is as follows: in the first period the 
government chooses between liberalization of the pre-existent tariff and keeping it. If it decides to extend 
protection, the game continues. Then, firms choose whether to prepare for trade liberalization in the next 
period or not. If the government lacks credibility, firms will believe that temporary protection will be 
applied in the next period as well and will never choose to prepare for liberalization. If international 
safeguard rules have enough enforcement power, they can reduce the length of temporary protection.       
Antidumping and countervailing measures 
 GATT/WTO includes Antidumping Agreement and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
that define dumping and subsidies, and provide a set of rules for dealing with them and placing restrictions 
on excessive use of such actions.  Below is a review of the literature dedicated to the need for regulation 
of antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) measures, and the negative consequences if such regulation 
is absent. 
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Staiger (1994) noted that, broadly, there are three adverse effects which can potentially arise from AD and 
CV misuse: measurement bias, unintended effect of “legitimate” use and abuse. 
Measurement bias may occur from the way dumping and subsidy margins are calculated. Boltuck and 
Litan (1991) among others came to the consistent conclusion that there tends to be a strong bias in the 
methodology of dumping and subsidy calculations that allow authorities to find a positive margin or 
subsidy. Thus, international rules concerning the procedures of calculating dumping and subsidies should 
avoid this problem. 
An unintended effect of AD and CV may arise, even if there is no measurement bias and laws seem to 
serve their purposes. One such case was studied by Gruenspecht (1988). He built a two-country two-
period duopoly model and scrutinized the implications of mutual antidumping enforcement. He reached 
the conclusion that mutual antidumping enforcement may limit output and push prices and costs of firms 
in both first and second periods, leading to a situation similar to the Prisoners Dilemma. Bagwell and 
Staiger (1989) showed that the threat of antidumping investigation may induce foreign governments to 
rely on export subsidies, even though CV measures may be applied. Staiger and Wolak (1992) pointed out 
that non-transparent AD laws can lead to lower output and trade, even if these laws are not utilized.      
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The consequences of abusing AD and CV measures is similar to one identified by Staiger and Wolak 
(1992) and which occur as a result of loose antidumping laws, allowing too frequent use of them. 
Pusa(1992) argued that the fact that domestic firms may demand an investigation and withdraw before a 
decision is made can threaten foreign firms and give home producers more bargaining power in the 
limiting presence of foreigners. Finally, Staiger and Wolak (1992) stated that domestic firms may initiate 
an antidumping investigation even if they do not count on success in order to limit foreign competition. 
Once again, a clear set of international rules on AD and CV measures would help to combat unnecessary 
use of these mechanisms. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Membership in the WTO potentially affects flows of capital through several channels. Below is a 
discussion of theoretical studies in this area.     
Volume of FDI 
Trade theory links FDI and volume of trade, but has two opposing points of view in this relation. Thus 
there are studies which state that trade and FDI are complementary, as well as those pointing out that trade 
and FDI are substitutes: i.e. an increase in trade is coupled by an increase (former) or decrease (latter) in 
FDI or vice versa. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that FDI is distinguished between horizontal and 
vertical. Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment goes to the production of the same goods and services 
abroad. Vertical FDI is directed at foreign production of goods and services at certain stages of making.  
Studies in favour of substitution between trade and FDI can be classified into internalization theory, 
eclectic paradigm and horizontal investment theory. Internalization theory origins from the Coase theory 
of the firm (the fundamental article is Coase, 1937), which introduces the concept of transaction costs to 
explain the size of firms, and was elaborated further by Williamson. Buckley and Casson (1976) 
formulated internalization theory as follows: firms will prefer FDI if costs of internalization, consisting of 
such overheads as communication, administrative and other internal organization costs are less than 
expenses implied by exports.  
Dunning (1980) developed a theory of eclectic paradigm, also known as the OLI framework. According to 
it, firms prefer FDI to trade if three advantages exist: Ownership, Location and Internalization. In case 
location advantage does not exist, firms prefer trade, so FDI and trade are two alternative strategies here.       
The theory of horizontal investment goes back to the 1950s and was pioneered by Robert Mundell and his 
“tariff jump” notion (Mundell, 1957). Developed further by Hortsmann and Markusen (1992) and 
Brainard (1993), it assumes the existence of scale economies at firm and plant level and trade costs. Thus, 
firms face a trade-off between concentration of production and proximity to consumers. If economies of 
scale are high and trade costs are relatively low, it is worth concentrating production at one location and 
supplying foreign markets with exports. On the contrary, if trade costs are higher than the pay-off from 
economies of scale, it is better to supply foreign markets from plants located there. Thus, FDI and trade 
are substitutes and become more so if trade costs rise. 
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The theory of vertical investment makes use of differences in relative factor costs and was developed by 
Helpman (1984). According to this theory, firms split the production process to different groups which are 
relatively intensive in certain factors of production. FDI takes the form of separating headquarters and 
plants and placing each production segment in a country with relative abundance in the required factors. 
FDI creates trade since plants have to trade their output as intermediate input to other plants. In this case 
trade and FDI are complementary.         
More recent models tried to combine vertical and horizontal FDI and were named Knowledge-capital 
models. Most known studies in this field are by Markusen et al. (1996), developed further by Markusen 
(1997), Markusen (2000) and Carr et al.(2001). According to Forte (2004), these models are based on 
three assumptions: first of all, headquarters activities such as research and development can be done in a 
separate location from production; second, headquarters activities require more qualified labour input 
relative to production; third, headquarters activities have a “public good” properties and can be used by 
several facilities. The first two assumptions imply vertical investment: headquarters are located where 
qualified labour is and production where non-qualified labour is cheap. The third assumption creates 
economies of scale and horizontal investment. Depending on such variables as trade costs, differences in 
factor endowments across countries, etc., combinations of vertical and horizontal investment are created, 
and FDI and trade can be complementary or substitutes. 
“Quality” of FDI 
Not only the volume of capital flows may change as a result of WTO accession, but “quality” of FDI as 
well. Bhagwati was the first to study theoretical connections between trade regime and gains from FDI 
(Bhagwati, 1978). This subject was also studied by Bhagwati (1985, 1994), Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 
(1977), and Brecher and Findlay (1983). The main idea is that benefits from investment depend on 
whether the trade regime is import-restrictive or export-promoting. If a country pursues an import 
restrictive policy, then investment will go to industries with no comparative advantage. In this case, FDI 
will not bring much benefit or can even be counterproductive by keeping inefficient industries working 
and diverting resources from efficient ones. Moreover, under the import-restrictive policy FDI may be 
affected by rent-seeking activities. An export-promoting regime, on the other hand, creates incentives for 
investment in competitive industries and does not bring distortions. On top of this, in that case production 
is not limited by the domestic market, and investment may promote production for foreign markets, which 
can result in additional benefits from economies of scale. WTO membership makes the trade regime more 
open with less import restrictiveness and more export development, hence increasing benefits from 
foreign direct investment.      
FDI and Intellectual Property Rights    
Most researchers agree that a country with stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection will 
attract more foreign investment. The reason is that a smaller risk of imitation increases demand for 
protected products and investing firms will enjoy longer periods of profitability. 
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Thus, Mansfield (1994) argues that if a developing country has weak IPR protection, multinational 
companies will be less eager to invest in such a country, and, if they do so, they would prefer to invest in a 
fully owned subsidiary or transfer outdated technology. 
Maskus (2000) reviewed the theoretical studies of how intellectual property rights influence foreign direct 
investment. He concluded that stronger IPR protection should be positively connected to the inflow of 
capital, but this relationship varies across different industries. The author argues that investment in low-
technology products (such as textiles, assembly of products, distribution) does not depend much on strong 
IPRs. Neither does investment in products, which are costly to imitate illegally. In contrast, firms that 
manufacture products which can be easily copied (such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, software) are 
highly interested in an efficient IPRs system and would pay particular attention to protection for patents 
and trade secrets. 
Conversely, Braga et al. (1998) identified two cases in which IPRs may have a negative effect on FDI 
inflow. First of all, strong IPR protection may give title holders excessive market power which can 
theoretically lead to a reduction of supply and higher prices. Second, being sure in a high level of 
protection, foreign producers might switch from foreign direct investment to licensing; the latter is less 
favourable for economic development in a recipient country, compared with inflow of capital.   
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2.3. Accession Process and Experience of Transition Countries 
Accession Process 
WTO accession is a complex and lengthy process and is becoming even more complicated as new WTO 
agreements and regulations come in force. Since the birth of the WTO in 1995 till the end of 2006, 21 
countries have become members and 30 more are seeking membership (WTO, 2005).  
Article XII of the WTO Agreement states: “Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the 
conduct of its trade policies is eligible to accede to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO 
Members”.  
To initiate the process of accession, a country should submit an official request for accession to the WTO 
Director General. This request is considered during the next General Council meeting, and, in the case of a 
positive decision, the applicant country receives observer status and a Working Party opens to all WTO 
members. In the case of a large accessing country, many members participate in the Working Party, if the 
candidate is small, usually only the “Quad” countries (Canada, the EU, Japan and United States) as well as 
neighbouring countries take part. 
Next, the applicant should present a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime. The Memorandum 
explains the policies and institutions of the acceding country and forms the basis for further negotiations. 
This document includes a description of economic policies and foreign trade in goods and services, the 
trade-related intellectual property regime, investment, economic integration agreements with third 
countries, the decision-making process as well as the statistical appendix. After the Memorandum has 
been circulated among the WTO members, the “question-answer” stage starts. Members ask questions in 
order to clarify indistinct points and wait for a reply from the applicant. This process is usually repeated 
several times until members are satisfied with the Memorandum. By the end of this stage, the Working 
Party issues a draft report, containing the Memorandum, the questions and answers and discussions of the 
Working Party.  
At some point during the “question-answer” process, the acceding country should submit an initial offer 
on goods and services which consists of a tariff schedule with an indication of the “bound” level of tariffs 
and a commitment on market access for services.      
Having completed the initial offer, the countries start bilateral negotiations. Members of the Working 
Party assess the initial offer and generally ask for further concessions and commitments. Negotiations 
continue until all sides are satisfied with the offer and result in signing a bilateral agreement. When the 
process of bilateral negotiations concludes, all commitments and concessions are combined in the 
Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and the Schedule of Specific Commitments on 
Services. 
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After that, the WTO Secretariat prepares the Accession Package, which consists of the following 
documents: 
 The Working Party Report; 
 The Protocol of Accession; 
 The Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods; 
 The Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services. 
This Accession Package should be adopted at the final Working Party meeting and passed for approval to 
the General Council or the Ministerial Conference. The Decision of the General Council or the Ministerial 
Conference should be adopted by consensus, or by two thirds in a case in which at least one country has 
objections. The applicant country signs the Protocol of Accession and 30 days after becomes a member of 
the WTO.    
Overall, the policy and regulations of the acceding country should be consistent with 15 mandatory 
agreements of the WTO (USAID, 2004): 
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
2. The Agreement on Agriculture 
3. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
4. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
5. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
6. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
7. The Agreement on Antidumping (AD)  
8. The Agreement on Customs Valuation  
9. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) 
10. The Agreement on Rules of Origin 
11. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
12. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (CVD) 
13. The Agreement on Safeguards (SG) 
14. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and 
15. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Accession experience of transition countries 
The experience of transition countries in gaining membership in the WTO is discussed below. Table 2.4 
presents the timeline of accession of the selected transition economies in Europe and Asia.   
The oldest members are several former socialist countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. They joined the GATT system prior to the WTO creation, and in 
order to become WTO members they just had to sign a draft charter on the WTO when it was established.    
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Bulgaria and China both applied in 1986, but the process of accession was quite lengthy, 10 and 15 years 
respectively. In fact, the accession of China is so far the longest one in the history of the WTO. The Baltic 
States applied in 1993-94 and it took them 5-6 years to gain membership.    
Out of the 12 CIS countries, only 4 have completed the application process: Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Contrary to China, Kyrgyzstan has set another record: the shortest accession in 
the history of the WTO, less than 3 years. Other countries are at different stages of progress. Turkmenistan 
has yet failed to submit its official application in accordance with WTO rules. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
have made modest progress so far: Uzbekistan had only 3 Working Party meetings during its 12 years of 
accession. Kazakhstan has made substantial progress recently, but according to United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission, the course was practically stagnant for some time. This happened because 
Kazakhstan made an initial offer with rates much higher than the applied ones: for some sectors there was 
no binding. It also made few commitments to open the services sector. Thus, when Kazakhstan made a 
tariff offer on goods in 1997, the Working Party members did not accept it as a basis for further 
negotiations (ESCAP 2001).       
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Country Application Membership Country Application  Membership 
EU 
accession 
countries 
Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary  
Poland 
Romania 
Slovak
Republic 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Other CEC 
Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
FYR
Macedonia 
11/1986 
03/1994 
11/1993 
01/1994 
11/1992 
05/1999 
09/1993 
12/1994 
12/1996 
04/1993 
(GATT) 
09/1973 
(GATT) 
10/1967 
(GATT) 
11/1971 
(GATT) 
04/1993 
(GATT) 
10/1994 
(GATT) 
11/1999 
02/1999 
05/2001 
09/2000 
11/2000 
04/2003 
Commonwealth 
of Independent 
States 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russia
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Asia
Cambodia 
China 
Mongolia 
The Lao PDR 
Viet Nam 
11/1993 
07/1997 
09/1993 
07/1996 
01/1996 
01/1996 
11/1993 
06/1993 
05/2001 
11/1993 
12/1994 
12/1994 
07/1986 
07/1991 
07/1997 
01/1995 
05/2003 
06/2000 
12/1998 
07/2001 
10/2004 
12/2001 
01/1997 
01/2007 
Table 2.4 WTO Accession of Selected Transition Countries. 
Source: WTO secretariat 
In 1992, the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR the status of observer in GATT and applied for 
accession in the middle of 1993. In February 1994, Russia submitted a Memorandum of the Foreign Trade 
Regime in the Russian Federation. Two years were needed to proceed sufficiently to establish a Working 
Party consisting of 58 members. At the start, the Working Party concentrated on a multilateral discussion 
of economic regulations and trade policy in Russia. In 1998, Russia submitted its initial tariff offer on 
goods and offers on government support of agriculture. In 1999, it submitted the first draft of specific 
commitments on services and a list of exemptions from MFN principle. Submission of these documents 
allowed bilateral negotiations to start. According to the Russian Ministry for Economic Development and 
Trade (www.wto.ru), over 50 countries are involved in trade negotiations on goods and over 30 countries 
in negotiations on services.  
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There are several issues which have provoked serious discussion between Russia and members of its 
Working Party: energy pricing, intellectual property rights, agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations, trade in services, civil aircraft, and other issues. 
Russian-exported energy resources are sold at world prices, while domestic sales are regulated by the 
government, which has resulted in considerably lower domestic prices. Several WTO members have 
expressed concerns that such dual pricing gives Russian producers an unfair competitive advantage and 
disagrees with the WTO regulation on subsidies. In return, the Russian side argued that lower domestic 
prices reflect comparative advantage in the production of energy and do not contradict WTO stipulations 
on subsidies, since they are provided to all economy, and not just to selected enterprises or industries 
(Cooper, 2006). 
Intellectual property rights in Russia are also raising concerns among WTO members, especially the USA. 
Although Russia has passed laws protecting intellectual property rights, and has become a member of 
major international conventions in this sphere, its enforcement of the laws is not sufficient. As estimated 
by the International Intellectual Property Rights Alliance, as a result of the violation of intellectual 
property rights in Russia losses of U.S. companies amounted to USD 1.7 billion in 2005 (IIPRA, 2006). 
At the end of 2005, Congress even threatened to call back its programme of Generalized System of 
Preferences for Russia if the latter did not enforce respective laws (Cooper, 2006). 
Agriculture has evoked some controversy as well. First of all, WTO members are not satisfied with the 
high level of support envisaged for the Russian agricultural sector, and claim that it is not in line with the 
current round of negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda. Second, the decision taken in 2003 to 
restrict imports of meat to Russia is argued as contradicting the “standstill” principle that requires 
countries to abstain from imposing new trade barriers while negotiating accession. 
Other significant disputed issues are the reluctance of Russia to allow the opening of branches of foreign 
banks and to sign the plurilateral WTO Civil Aircraft Agreement, which is approved by only 26 WTO 
members and requires elimination of the tariffs on trade in aircrafts, and some equipment (Cooper, 2006). 
The Russian Federation has chosen to follow a protectionist strategy in negotiating tariff rates. As shown 
in Table 2.5, the weighted average rates of import tariffs on agricultural products was 14.7% in 2001, but 
Russian authorities planned to agree initial bound tariff rates at a level of 34.7%: it is intended that even 
the final bound rate after the transition period will stay at the level of 25%, which is even higher than prior 
to the WTO membership. The same picture is for industrial goods: the initial tariff rate is 14%, the final 
one almost 10%. Industries which are projected to receive a high level of protection are textiles, 
metallurgy, and machinery.  
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 Applied import tariff 
rate, % 
(as of Jan. 2001) 
Initial bound rate 
of import tariff, % 
Final bound rate 
of import tariff, % 
Agricultural goods 14.70 34.71 25.11 
Industrial goods 9.73 14.32 9.84 
Including: 
Mineral products 5.43 11.06 5.43 
Chemicals 8.48 10.22 6.09 
Forestry, paper industry 8.73 14.62 7.85 
Textiles 11.69 18.31 12.37 
Metallurgy 11.35 19.29 11.70 
Machinery 9.48 14.83 8.75 
Table 2.5 Weighted Average of Applied and Bound Rate of Tariffs in Russia.
Source: www.wto.ru 
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The next table (Table A.1 in appendix) summarizes the commitments made by some of the new WTO 
members. Bound import tariff rates vary quite considerably among countries: from 10% to 35% for 
agricultural products and from 5% to 20% for industrial goods.  
Bulgaria has the highest level of protection for agricultural products: the average import tariff rate is 
almost 35%, followed by that of Latvia, with 33.6%. Two other Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania have 
also set high tariffs for agricultural imports: 17.7% and 15.6% respectively. Other countries, excluding 
Mongolia, are committed to an average 10-12% of import tariffs on agricultural goods. Mongolia 
negotiated on an 18.4% import tariff rate for agricultural products and 20% for industrial goods. Bulgaria, 
Latvia and Lithuania follow with 12.6%, 9.3% and 8.2% import tariffs rates for industrial products 
respectively. Other countries have agreed to set import tariffs for industrial goods at the 5-6% level. All 
countries are committed to cease export subsidies for agriculture and have agreed to keep the limit of the 
total aggregated measurement of support to agriculture at a level of agricultural production of either 5% or 
10% depending on their income. 
Several studies have concentrated on the peculiarities of accession to the WTO by transition countries. 
Thus, Michalopoulos (1998) pointed that transition countries have specific impediments on the way to the 
WTO membership. Michalopoulos (1998) has drawn attention to the fact that “(a) there are extensive 
legislative requirements that need to be met prior to accession and, legislative processes are inherently 
time consuming; (b) acceding countries have weak institutional capacities and sometimes even lack 
familiarity with the economic and legal issues that need to be addressed; (c) WTO members have been 
placing greater demands on acceding countries than the disciplines required from existing members; 
(d) … compared with the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO provides much less technical assistance in 
support of accession; (e) accession requires that the specific commercial interests of all members are 
addressed, which requires extensive and time consuming negotiations.” The United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission (ESCAP, 2001) also point to the lack of analytical and policy-making experience of 
transition countries, especially during preparation of the Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime as 
well as the question and answer stage. Another significant barrier is constantly raising requirements to the 
new members, as WTO rules become more sophisticated.  
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2.4 Ukraine and World Trade Organization 
The process of Ukraine’s accession to WTO system started in 1993, when the official application was 
submitted; later in 1994 a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime of Ukraine was sent to the WTO 
Secretariat. Altogether, 17 Working Party meetings have been held. The chronology of these meetings, 
agenda and decision of the Working Party are given below.  
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Monitoring of economic policies and import 
regulations and their compliance with GATT/WTO 
requirements 
In particular: 
 Privatization; 
 Subsidies to goods manufacturers; 
 Tariff and non-tariff regulation; 
 Budget and monetary policy; 
 Standards; 
 Trade-related intellectual property regime; 
WP requested additional information  on trade 
regime 
Reform of agricultural sector Ukraine should set reform of agricultural sector as 
a main goal for preparation for the second WP 
meeting 
First meeting of the Working Party 
February 27-28, 1995 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services  
Since Ukraine’s economy is in transition, negotiations on 
market access should be based not on applied import 
tariff rates, but on Concept of Custom Rates 
Transformation 
Reform of agricultural sector, in particular: 
Brining protection rules on accordance with 
the GATT/WTO system; 
SPS measures, privatization; 
Agricultural trade enterprises. 
Conduct tariffication of non-tariff barriers 
State of services market, degree of its 
compliance with the GATS 
WP requested additional information  on trade in 
services 
State of intellectual property rights system, 
degree of its compliance with the TRIPS 
Legislation should be changed to comply with the TRIPS 
requirements 
Improvement of state trading system Changes in legislature are required 
Bilateral trade agreements of Ukraine More information is needed. 
Second meeting of the Working Party 
December 11-12, 1995 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Harmonization of foreign trade legislation in 
accordance with WTO requirements 
WP expressed concerns about official position of 
Ukraine’s government to improve trade balance through 
decrease of imports 
Study of schedule of commitments on 
services 
More work is needed, especially concerning banking 
sector, telecommunications and sea transport 
Analysis of standards, certification and 
licensing system  
System of non tariff regulation does not correspond to 
the WTO requirements and aims at decrease of imports. 
This concerns a system of indicative prices, registration 
of contracts, certification. 
WP points at import-prohibitive nature of such barriers. 
Analysis of Ukraine’s trade preferential 
agreements 
Ukraine should revise an agreement on industrial 
cooperation within the CIS countries, since it disagrees 
with nondiscrimination WTO requirements 
Third meeting of the Working Party 
December 11-12, 1995 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Discussion of first round of negotiations on 
market access for goods 
WP pointed at negative consequences of specific import 
tariff, established at 1996 
Discussion of first round of negotiations on 
market access for services 
WP positively evaluated commitments made by Ukraine 
and proposed concentrating on financial and insurance 
markets  
Analysis of standards, certification and 
licensing system  
WP once again drew attention to non transparency of 
non-tariff barriers in Ukraine 
Analysis of Custom Code project Custom Code project is a good starting point, but more 
work is needed on customs valuation and rules of origin 
Discussion of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
WP does not agree to set base period of agriculture 
support as in years 1986-1990 
Fourth meeting of the Working Party 
May 6-7, 1997 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services  
WP pointed to following positive developments 
intentions of Ukraine to: 
 Join Reference Paper on 
telecommunications; 
 Decrease import tariffs for IT goods to zero; 
 Do not apply export subsidies for agricultural 
products.   
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector  
Following problems were noticed: 
 Law “On State Regulation of agricultural 
imports”; 
 Excess requirements concerning certification 
of goods; 
 Minimal prices on agricultural import.   
Review of Memorandum on taxation regime in 
Ukraine 
WP expressed concerns about the Law “On support 
of car production in Ukraine” 
Review of Memorandum on technical barriers 
to trade 
There is a need to establish an information centre on 
standardization and certification; reciprocally 
recognize certificates.  
Review of Memorandum on sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures 
There is a need to establish an information centre on 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures; reciprocally 
recognize certificates. 
Additional questions Ukraine gave answers on additional questions of the 
WP concerning foreign trade regime 
Fifth meeting of the Working Party 
November 24-25, 1997 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Developments in the foreign policy of Ukraine Worries were expressed concerning significant 
deterioration of trade and investment climate in 
Ukraine; discrimination during collection of VAT and 
excise tax; appliance of minimal prices.      
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services
Considerable progress was noticed, some countries 
stated that they are close to signing bilateral 
agreement with Ukraine 
Technical barriers to trade, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures 
WP again stressed the discrimination character of 
import control system, for instance requirements to 
obtain several certificates on one good, etc. Without 
significant improvement in technical barriers no 
further progress in accession is possible 
Intellectual property rights Ukraine disseminated Memorandum on intellectual 
property rights and requested 3 years transition 
period.   
Sixth meeting of the Working Party 
July 10, 1998 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of legislation WP were interested in studying following laws: 
 Custom Code; 
 Law on custom valuation; 
 Law on state trade. 
Also, questions were raised concerning import 
quotas, TBT, SPS and preferential excise tax 
payment for domestic goods.   
Privatization Ukraine informed about privatization of its 
enterprises and clarified requirements to 
investment and its sources. 
Agriculture European Union stated that its companies had 
difficulties accessing Ukrainian agricultural 
market. 
TBT WP noticed positive changes in TBT and 
requested additional information about goods, 
subject to compulsory certification. 
SPS WP requested Ukraine to provide full information 
of adjusting legislature according to WTO 
requirements. 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine has a number of subsidies: support of 
domestic car production, free economic zones 
with tax privileges. Request was made concerning 
adjustment of legislature and state enterprises, 
functioning in free economic zones.   
TRIPS WP requested Ukraine to provide full information 
of adjusting legislature according to WTO 
requirements. 
Trade with CIS countries WP asked for information concerning trade 
benefits to CIS countries which constrain trade 
with other countries 
Seventh meeting of the Working Party 
July 12, 2000 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP noted that first bilateral protocols were signed 
with Mexico, Uruguay and New Zealand and 
several other countries are close to signing it.  
Review of legislation WP concentrated on legislation concerning import 
licensing, import taxes, custom valuation. 
Further agenda of the WP Adjustment of legislature according to WTO 
requirements is a prerequisite of further progress in 
accession 
Eighth meeting of the Working Party 
June 13-14, 2001 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
More bilateral protocols were signed. Ukraine 
provided revised tariff concession schedule. 
Review of legislature  Ukraine provided WP with new schedule of 
adopting WTO-related legislature. It consisted of 20 
laws, which were planned to be approved by March 
2003.   
Discussion of documents provided prior to 
WP meeting concerning TBT, SPS, 
intellectual property rights, tax regime. 
WP acknowledged that Ukraine fulfilled its 
obligations, made during last meeting.  More 
detailed study of legislation is needed, especially 
Custom Code, import licensing, and intellectual 
property rights.  
Further agenda of the WP WP made decision to prepare check-list of 
questions concerning trade regime of Ukraine. 
Answers to these questions will become a basis for 
draft Report of the WP 
Multilateral meeting of WP members 
concerning agriculture 
Ukraine disseminated document describing 
strategy of agricultural sector developments and 
grounds for defining level of domestic support 
Ninth meeting of the Working Party 
July 25-26, 2002 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services
Considerable progress was made during bilateral 
negotiations; relatively few questions are left 
undecided. 
Review of legislature  Ukraine approved 15 out of 20 laws, planned as a 
phase of adjustment. Such questions as sanitary 
and veterinary legislation have to be studied 
additionally.  
Review of Ukraine’s replies to a check-list of 
questions 
During review of consolidated check-list of 
questions and answers main attention was drawn 
to following topics: 
 Privatization; 
 Licensing of imports; 
 Custom valuation, custom clearance (in 
particular rational for financial backing of 
transit goods); 
 Sanitary requirements (in particular 
necessity of sanitary control of transit 
goods, doubling of sanitary requirements 
by different branches of authorities); 
 Agriculture, rational for setting 2000-2003 
as a base for calculation of total 
measurement of support.  
Further agenda of the WP  WP and Ukraine should: 
 Continue bilateral negotiations; 
 Monthly monitor schedule of adopting 
legislature; 
 Prepare revised answers to Consolidated 
check-list of questions and answers; 
 Hold multilateral negotiations concerning 
state support of agriculture; 
 Start preparing first draft of WP Report.   
Tenth meeting of the Working Party 
February 25-26, 2003 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
There are several unsettled questions in bilateral 
negotiations. The concern is import tariffs for 
sensitive sectors of economy, like agriculture, 
fishery, food processing. 
Review of legislature  WP was informed about newly adopted legislature 
in spheres of technical regulations, intellectual 
property rights, and dissemination of audio and 
video records, software. WP requested additional 
work on laws concerning TBT and SPS. 
Review of Ukraine’s replies to a check-list of 
questions 
WP noted that more work is needed in following 
spheres: 
 Foreign currency regulation; 
 Price regulation; 
 Privatization; 
 Licensing; 
 SPS. 
Further agenda of the WP Ukraine should: 
 Proceed with legislative reforms; 
 Prepare answers to additional questions 
concerning market access. 
Eleventh meeting of the Working Party 
October 27-28, 2003
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP noticed progress in bilateral negotiations 
and admitted that Ukraine faces additional 
requirements that emerge from current 
multilateral trade round of the WTO 
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
WP requested additional information 
concerning proposition of applying tariff 
quotas on sugar  
Review of foreign trade regime WP requested additional information 
concerning export restrictions of some 
products, i.e.: cattle, leather, scrap of ferrous 
steel, sunflower seeds 
Twelfth meeting of the Working Party 
April 26-30, 2004 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Foreign exchange regulations Regulation, requiring obligatory sale of 50% of 
foreign exchange revenues should be ceased   
Support of domestic enterprises Subsidies to automobile sector should be 
eliminated without transition period; 
Minimum and maximum prices for imports and 
exports should be abolished; 
No quantitative restrictions on fish and fish 
products trade should be applied 
Review of legislature Concerns were raised resulting from VAT 
exemptions on certain imports from Russia, 
including crude oil and some agricultural products 
Thirteenth meeting of the Working Party 
September 20-21, 2004 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine should abolish privileged VAT tax 
rate for domestic producers of automobiles; 
No discrimination should be practiced in Free 
Economic Zones. 
Review of legislature Custom Code should not violate geographical 
indications requirements; 
Export tax for steel scrap should be canceled 
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Problems arise due to application of minimal 
prices for sugar 
Fourteenth meeting of the Working Party 
March 22-23, 2005 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Support of domestic enterprises Ukraine should cancel: 
 Restrictions on automobile imports with 
regard of their age; 
 Subsidies for natural gas purchase to 
selected enterprises; 
 Restrictions on export of non-ferrous steel 
scrap; 
 Export tax for ferrous steel should be 5% 
at the end of transition period  
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Abolish minimal prices for sugar 
Review of legislature Laws in following spheres need additional work: 
 Import licensing of alcoholic beverages; 
 Veterinary regulations   
Fifteenth meeting of the Working Party 
November 23-24, 2005 
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Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of the latest achievements in bilateral 
negotiations on market access of goods and 
services 
WP was pleased that bilateral negotiations were 
concluded with all countries, besides Kyrgyzstan. 
The issues which were raised by Kyrgyzstan may 
be politically motivated  
Review of domestic support and export 
subsidies in agricultural sector 
Ukraine should eliminate price control over 
agricultural commodities; 
Import quotas on sugar should be cancelled and 
transparent procedures for tariff quotas should be 
set; 
Review of legislature Changes should be made to: 
 The law on banking activities to allow 
establishment of foreign banks branches; 
 The Value Added Tax law remaining 
national treatment violations; 
 The Law on Government procurement 
Sixteenth meeting of the Working Party 
June 15-16, 2006 
Agenda Decision of the Working Party 
Review of Ukraine’s progress with regard to 
becoming a WTO member 
Progress of Ukraine was acknowledge as 
sufficient to become a WTO member 
Review of commitments in goods and 
services 
Final commitments of Ukraine with regard to 
trade in goods and services were agreed  
Draft decision concerning accession of 
Ukraine to the WTO 
Ukraine may accede to the WTO Agreement 
on the terms and conditions agreed during 
this Working Party 
Seventeenth meeting of the Working Party 
January 25, 2008 
Bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and WTO members started in 1997. There are 51 countries which 
decided to conduct such negotiations; by the end of 2007, all 51 protocols had been signed (Table 2.6).   
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2001 Mexico
Uruguay  
New Zealand  
2004 Switzerland  
Argentina  
Malaysia  
Paraguay  
Lithuania  
Turkey  
Mongolia  
Sri Lanka 
2002 Canada  
Republic of Korea  
Slovenia  
Georgia  
Latvia  
India 
2005 El Salvador  
Japan  
Norway  
Indonesia  
Moldova  
Croatia  
Iceland  
Peru  
Ecuador  
China  
Honduras  
Dominican  
Republic
Morocco  
Romania 
2003 Hungary  
European Union  
Czech Republic  
Slovakia
Bulgaria  
Cuba  
Israel  
Poland  
Brazil  
Estonia  
Thailand 
2006 USA
Armenia  
Panama  
Australia  
Egypt  
Columbia  
Chinese Taipei 
Table 2.6 Signature of Bilateral Protocols between Ukraine and WTO Members 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine 
During bilateral negotiations, WTO members raised the following issues: 
Lithuania  Goods: machinery, import duty on mineral oil products. 
Argentina  Goods: geographical indications, in particular wine and cheese. Domestic support of 
agriculture  
Turkey   Goods: metal scrap 
El Salvador  Goods: market access of cane sugar 
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Japan   Goods: certification of electronic goods;  
Services: enforcement of intellectual property rights protection; market access of foreign banks’ branches 
and insurance companies. 
Norway  Goods: Norway required larger concessions on fish, canned fish, and navigation 
equipment.  
Services: market access for sea transport and telecommunications. 
Moldova  Goods: questions concerning Ukraine’s trade regime, i.e.: transit, licensing;  
Services: presence of natural persons   
Croatia   Goods: agricultural products. 
Iceland   Goods: fish, food processing machinery 
China   Goods: textiles  
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Services: sea transport 
USA   Goods: agricultural products (poultry, fish);  
Services: enforcement of intellectual property rights protection; market access of foreign banks’ branches 
and insurance companies. 
Australia  Goods: market access for cane sugar; increase of quota for cane sugar; abolishment of 
minimal prices for sugar; commitments concerning reforms in sugar industry; geographical indications 
Chinese Taipei  Goods: fish;  
Services: sea transport, financial services  
Kyrgyz Republic        Goods: agricultural products, textile, machinery; (signed in late 2007)                
Other: dispute over state debt 
There are five types of WTO commitments which Ukraine had to make: goods commitments, services 
commitments, legal, rules, and notification ones. 
Goods commitments 
This type of commitment refers to binding import tariff rates and agricultural subsidies commitments.   
As mentioned earlier, prior to WTO accession, Ukraine applied Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs 
(applicable to 45% of imports in 2002), full import tariffs (relevant to only 3% of imports), as well as Free 
Trade Agreements with a number of significant trade partners (53% of imports came from them in 2002).  
The first consolidated tariff offer was submitted to the WTO in 1999 and was revised for several times 
afterwards. Table 2.7 presents the MFN, full tariffs, as well as the WTO tariff commitment of Ukraine for 
key sectors. In general, bound tariffs under WTO are quite low: around 11.1% for agricultural products 
and 4.6% for industrial goods.  
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MFN Tariff Full Tariff Post-WTO 
Agriculture 26.7 78.7 19.4 
Fishery 21.2 57.2 10.0 
Mining of coal and peat 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Production of non-energy 
materials 
1.1 7.2 1.1 
Food-processing 50.5 68.2 18.9 
Textiles and leather 8.2 20.2 4.0 
Forestry, wood working, paper 
industry 
8.1 24.0 4.9 
Petroleum refinement 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chemicals 7.9 17.4 5.8 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
11.1 23.0 10.0 
Metallurgy 3.8 9.8 1.5 
Machinery 7.3 19.8 3.5 
Miscellaneous 9.8 30.6 8.5 
Table 2.7 Import Tariff Commitments of Ukraine
Source: WTO, IER (2006) calculations Dutch Grant # TF 050270 
To define the bound level of domestic support, Ukraine proposed to choose the base period of 1994 – 
1996. The Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) constitutes 5% of agricultural production, or roughly 
USD 1.4 bn.    
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Services commitments 
There are four modes of transactions identified by GATS classification depending on the territorial 
presence of supplier and consumer at the time of the transaction (WT/ACC/10, 2001): 
 Mode 1 refers to cross-border trade (the supply of a service from the territory of one member into 
the territory of any other member); 
 Mode 2 to consumption of services abroad (the supply of a service in the territory of one member 
to the service consumer of any other member); 
 Mode 3 to commercial presence (the supply of a service by a service supplier of one member, 
through commercial presence in the territory of any other member);  and 
 Mode 4 to the presence of natural persons (the supply of a service by a service supplier of one 
member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other member). 
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Limitations based on these classifications are:   
 limitations on the number of service suppliers;  
 limitations on the total value of service transactions and assets;  
 limitations on the total number of service operations as the total quantity of service output;  
 limitations on the total number of natural persons employed; restrictions on specific types of legal 
entity as joint venture;  
 ceilings on foreign equity participation. 
Partial commitments of Ukraine, i.e. those which have some limitations, are presented in Table 2.8 below.  
Sectors  Limitations on market access Limitations on national 
treatment 
Horizontal commitments 
Land ownership No limitations 3), 4) Foreigners cannot 
acquire agricultural purposes 
land. No limitations on renting 
land.  
Subsidies No limitations Only citizens of Ukraine have 
the right to obtain subsidies.   
Movement of natural 
persons 
4) Foreigners should obtain work 
permits.  
No limitations 
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Sectoral commitments 
Notary services 1), 3), 4) Only citizens of Ukraine 
are permitted to supply notary 
services 
No limitations 
Auditing services 1) Requirement of a compulsory 
confirmation by an auditing firm of 
Ukraine of a foreign auditor's 
conclusion 
No limitations 
Medical and dental 
services 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
3) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian. 
Services provided by 
midwives, nurses, 
physiotherapists and 
paramedics 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
3) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian. 
Postal services 1), 2), 3) Licensing systems may 
be established for some sub-
sectors. 
No limitations 
Education services 3) Only a citizen of Ukraine may be 
the head of an educational 
institution. 
No limitations 
Insurance services 3) Five years transition period is 
required 
No limitations 
Reinsurance and 
retrocession services 
1) Foreign re-insurer should have a 
continuous experience in the 
insurance activity not less than 
three years. 
No limitations 
Money market 
instruments  
3) Requirement to register as a 
legal entity 
No limitations 
Services related to 
derivative products 
3) Requirement to register as a 
legal entity 
No limitations 
Other negotiable 
instruments, including 
gold bars 
3) Requirement to register as a 
legal entity 
No limitations 
Securities emission 3) Only legal persons engaged 
exclusively in issuance of 
securities, and banks; 
No limitations 
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Asset management  3) Requirement to register as a 
legal entity 
No limitations 
Hospital services 3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
4) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian 
Other human health 
services 
3) Professional qualification 
requirements according to 
Ukrainian legislation 
4) Foreigners must speak 
Ukrainian 
News agency services 3) Foreign investment is limited to 
30%
No limitations 
International transport  4) Unbound, except as  provided in 
the horizontal section 
No limitations 
Table 2.8 Partial Services Commitments of Ukraine. 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, WTO Secretariat 
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Legal commitments 
Legal commitments concern laws, regulations, etc. which have to be adopted prior to accession to the 
WTO. Some important laws which had to be implemented or changed are:   
Law on cancellation of export ban for metal scrap to replace export ban for metal scrap with export duty 
for these products and to reduce such duties gradually. 
Law on tariff rate quota for raw cane sugar to eliminate quotas on imports of cane sugar and replace it 
with tariff rate quotas in order to meet bilateral commitments of Ukraine. 
Law on banks and banking activities to allow for establishing of foreign banks’ subsidiaries in Ukraine 
according to a WTO member’s request. 
Law on state support of agriculture in Ukraine to eliminate minimum import prices and other WTO-
inconsistent provisions. 
Law on alcohol and tobacco and some articles of Law on the taxation system to bring import licence fees 
in line with GATT 1994 and eliminate discriminatory fees for spirits, alcohol and tobacco products. 
Law on procurement of goods, services, and works to indicate that state enterprises are subject to the Law 
on government procurement only when procuring for governmental use. 
Law on some issues of imports of vehicles into Ukraine - to eliminate age limit on import of used vehicles. 
Rules commitments 
The main aim of the rules commitments is to establish whether Ukraine’s policy conforms to WTO rules 
and, in particular, how it should be changed if necessary. State bodies should confer with these 
commitments before making decisions, which would affect foreign trade regime.   
There are different types of rules commitments (WT/ACC/10, 2001):  
 Statements of fact rather than commitments;  
 Obligations to stand by existing WTO rules, sometimes specifying national measures to be 
amended to bring them into conformity with WTO provisions on the subject in question, 
sometimes elaborating on the WTO provisions on the subject in question;   
 Obligations not to have recourse to specific WTO provisions, e.g. those relating to transitional 
periods. These most often relate to customs valuation and TRIPS; 
Accession to the WTO: Part I
70 
Theory and Practice of GATT/WTO
 Specific identification of transitional periods that may be used, e.g. customs valuation. These 
relate to right of appeal, other duties and charges, subsidiaries and trade-related investment 
measures; 
 Authorisation to depart temporarily from WTO rules or from commitments in the Goods Schedule. 
These are related to internal taxes, import licensing, technical barriers to trade and agricultural 
support; 
 Obligations to abide by rules created by the commitment paragraph and not contained in WTO 
Multilateral Agreements. These relate to an obligation to comply with "WTO obligations and 
other international obligations", privatisation, sub-central governments, government procurement, 
trade in civil aircraft and publication. 
The selected rules commitments of Ukraine are listed below. 
State ownership and privatization 
Ukraine would provide periodic reports to WTO Members on developments in its programme of 
privatization. 
Pricing policies 
Ukraine introduced changes to the Law "On State Support of Agriculture in Ukraine" which would cancel 
the provisions on minimum purchase prices applied to imports, as well as the provisions on the 
introduction of quotas on imports or exports. 
Customs duties 
Ukraine committed not to change the staging of the tariff reductions, as indicated in its tariff offer. 
Ukraine would not list any "other duties and charges" in its Schedule of Concessions and Commitments 
on Goods, binding such charges at zero from the date of accession. 
Tariff rate quotas, tariff exemptions 
From the date of accession, Ukraine would allocate its only tariff rate quota on raw cane sugar in 
conformity with the WTO requirements. Allocation methods would not have trade-restrictive or distortive 
effects on imports. Ukraine would introduce a process of consultation with trading partners, importers and 
exporters prior to the amendment of the tariff quota. 
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Application of Internal Taxes on Imports 
Ukraine would apply its domestic taxes, including the excise taxes and value added taxes, in full 
compliance with provisions of the WTO, including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. Ukraine would amend the Laws on VAT and taxation of agricultural producers to ensure full 
conformity with the provisions of WTO upon accession. 
Import licensing systems 
Ukraine will eliminate the ban on imports of buses, trucks and cars older than eight years.  From the date 
of accession, Ukraine would eliminate and would not apply quantitative restrictions on imports such as 
licensing, quotas, bans, etc., that cannot be justified under the WTO provisions. 
Anti-dumping, countervailing duties, safeguard regimes 
Ukraine would not apply any anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures until it had 
implemented appropriate laws in conformity with the provisions of the WTO Agreements on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, and on Safeguards.   
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Export restrictions 
Ukraine is committed to eliminate the export ban on non-ferrous scrap by the date of accession, and to 
substitute it by export duties. 
Export subsidies 
From the date of accession Ukraine will not maintain export subsidies. 
TBT 
Ukraine would ensure that only technical regulations meeting WTO requirements would be mandatory. 
Ukraine would not use standards and technical regulations in a manner that would be restrictive to 
international trade, prohibitive to imports, and discriminatory of individual exporters and suppliers.   
SPS measures 
The Enquiry point on SPS measures would be in operation from the date of Ukraine’s accession to the 
WTO. Ukraine would apply all its SPS measures consistently with the requirements of the corresponding 
WTO Agreements without any transitional arrangements.   
State-trading entities 
State owned enterprises would make purchases of goods and services, which were not intended for 
governmental use and sales in international trade in accordance with commercial considerations, and 
would give enterprises of other WTO members adequate opportunities. 
Transparency 
From the date of accession, all legislation related to trade would be published promptly in a manner that 
fulfils WTO requirements.  Therefore, no law or regulation related to international trade would become 
effective prior to such publication in an official source of information. 
Notification commitments 
Ukraine, along with other members, agreed to comply with notification commitments. The purpose of 
such commitments is to prevent WTO member states from creating obstacles to international trade 
through national measures, which sometimes may be non transparent for other members. Under these 
commitments, Ukraine is obliged to report all proposed changes in regulations which affect the operation 
of the WTO system.    
Ukraine is committed to notify changes in all major fields which fall under WTO agreements: trade in 
goods and services, agriculture, SPS and TBT, TRIMS, antidumping, subsidies, safeguard measures, etc. 
Notification commitments state in what cases Ukraine should notify WTO; to whom exactly it should send 
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notification; terms, during which notification should be made; what kind of information should be 
provided; and the proposed format of notification.   
Hence, in the case of safeguard measures, Ukraine should inform about: (a) initiating an investigatory 
process relating to serious injury or threat to domestic industry and the reasons for it; (b) finding a case of 
serious injury or threat caused by increased imports; (c) taking a decision to apply or extend a safeguard 
measure.  
Notification should be made to the Committee on Safeguards. Information has to be sent as soon as 
Ukraine arrives at any of the three cases pointed above. In the case of a provisional safeguard measure 
Ukraine should notify before taking this measure. Notification should contain evidence of serious injury or 
threat caused by increased imports, a precise description of the product involved and the proposed 
measure, the proposed date of introduction, the expected duration and timetable for progressive 
liberalization. In case of an extension of a measure - evidence that the industry concerned is adjusting 
shall also be provided. 
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3. Methodology of Research 
3.1 Computable General Equilibrium Models 
A Computable General Equilibrium model is a model of fundamental economic links between incomes of 
various groups, demand pattern, multisector production structure, and foreign economies. The model 
incorporates behavioural equations describing the economic actions of agents, and the technological and 
institutional constraints facing them (Thissen, 1998). In line with Dixon (2006), it is useful to give further 
insight into the definition of Computable General Equilibrium models by looking at each word that forms 
its name. 
CGE models include explicit specification of the behaviour of several economic agents and captures inter-
linkages between those agents, thus these models are general. Households maximize utility, while 
producers either maximize profits or minimize costs and make decisions on consumption and production 
based on optimizing assumptions. There are also behavioural equations for other agents, such as 
government, foreign sector participants, etc. 
Demand and supply decisions of economic agents define the level of prices and production such that 
demand is equal to supply for all commodities and factors; markets are in equilibrium.
CGE models are solved using special software and produce numerical results, so they are computable.
CGE models can be used for real-world applications with actual input data and relevant output. This 
feature makes the CGE method extremely useful for policy analysis of many issues, including changes in 
trade regime, tax reform, agricultural policy, regional development, etc. Because of this, such a model is 
also called an Applied General Equilibrium model.     
CGE models have their roots in the Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which was re-formalized in the 
1950s. The study of Arrow and Debreu (1954) is one of the fundamental studies which states that the 
situation exists when all markets are in equilibrium and demand does not exceed supply. In the applied 
sense, CGE modelling starts with the Leontief input-output analysis described in Leontief (1936, 1941). 
The central idea of this approach is to consider inter-linkages between different industries and economic 
agents. The output of each industry is used as an input for other industries or goes to final consumption, 
making all agents dependent on each other. 
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The first empirical CGE models were built by Johansen (1960) and Harberger (1962). Johansen used a 
model with 20 cost-minimizing production sectors and utility-maximizing consumer to identify sources of 
economic growth in Norway. Harberger built a two-sector model to investigate tax policy issues in the 
USA. Neither author has checked for the presence of multiple equilibrium and the existence of a unique 
equilibrium near the benchmark equilibrium. A breakthrough in solving a general equilibrium model was 
reached by Scarf in 1967. He developed an algorithm for the solution of general equilibrium problem 
which was quite general in its nature. This algorithm assured finding an equilibrium set of prices under the 
most general conditions and did not require special constraints on specification of the model. Although the 
algorithm has been substantially augmented since that time, it was a breakthrough in the sense of giving 
researchers the opportunity to build more detailed and complex models than before.          
According to Iqbal et al. (2001), for several years following Scarf’s advance CGE modelling did not 
receive much attention. Then, one of the earliest policy-oriented general equilibrium models was devised 
by Shoven and Whalley (1972), Whalley (1975, 1977), Shoven (1976) who studied different aspects of 
fiscal reform and Miller and Spencer (1977) with the model of the UK joining the European Economic 
Community.  
As mentioned earlier, CGE models are being applied to a wide variety of issues and there are several 
literature surveys on this topic. Thus, Shoven and Whalley (1984) reviewed two issues: applied general 
equilibrium tax models and models of international trade. de Melo (1988) discussed models for trade 
policy analysis in developing countries. Nielsen (2003) covered the literature on CGE models of regional 
and preferential trade agreements. Piermartini and Teh (2005) discussed applications of general 
equilibrium to trade policy, placing accent on GATT/WTO issues. Decaluwe and Martens (1988) 
reviewed the peculiarities of modelling developing economies and included 73 applications to 26 
countries. Bandara (1991) surveyed CGE modelling of development policies in Least Developed 
Countries. Pereira and Shoven (1988) surveyed studies of dynamic CGE models of tax policy evaluation. 
Devarajan (1988) discussed the application of general equilibrium models to energy issues. Bhattacharyya 
(1996) reviewed CGE studies of energy and environmental issues. Robinson (1991) surveyed “micro-
macro” CGE models with financial variables. Kraybill (1993) as well as Partridge and Rickman (1998) 
reviewed CGE models of regional economies and their application to regional policy issues. In 2004, 
Partridge updated his review of regional modelling. Kraev (2003) reviewed literature on general 
equilibrium models of stabilization and adjustment packages. Some other general reviews on CGE 
literature are by Shoven and Whalley (1992), Dixon and Parmenter (1996), and Ginsburg and Keyzer 
(1997).  
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A fundamental principle of Computable General Equilibrium modelling is captured by a circular flow of 
income in economy; a typical one is presented in Figure 3.1. Households are owners of factors of 
production (in this case, labour and capital) and receive income from them; additional income is the form 
of transfers from the government. Households spend their revenues on consumption and taxes and save 
the rest. The government redistributes income from taxes to transfers, consumption and savings. Domestic 
savings coupled with foreign savings form the capital market. Household consumption, government 
consumption and investment all go to the product market, which is made from domestic goods and 
imports. Producers receive income from domestic sales and exports and spend it on domestic and foreign 
intermediate consumption as well as factor payments.  
Circular flow of income implies three conditions of equilibrium. First of all, for a given commodity a 
quantity produced is equal to quantity demanded and there is a market clearance. Second, revenues from 
production of goods are allocated to households as payment for factors of production, to intermediate 
demand and to government as taxes, thus a condition of zero profit holds. Finally, returns of households 
from factor endowments are spent on purchases of goods, taxes and savings and there is an income 
balance.  
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Figure 3.1 Circular Flow of Income
Source: adopted from Piermartini et al. (2005) 
In practice, circular flow of income is captured by organizing data in the Social Accounting Matrix. Data 
are represented in a form of matrix where columns show the expenditure of each agent and rows show 
costs of output; each entry is an income for some agent and expenditure for another. Given that there is a 
market clearance, income balance and zero profit, the sum of the entries in ith row must be equal to a sum 
of entries in ith column. Figure A.2 shows an example of Social Accounting Matrix (given in Appendix). 
Rows and columns contain the same title entries: activities, commodities (one activity can produce more 
than one commodity), factors of production, enterprises, households, government, capital account and 
foreign sector. Thus, in the commodities’ row intermediate demand, household consumption, government 
consumption, investment and exports sum up to aggregate demand on a given commodity. In the 
commodities’ column, gross domestic output and imports constitute the aggregate supply of a commodity. 
Aggregate demand is equal to aggregated supply for each commodity. Household income is the sum of 
income from factors of production, transfers from government and foreign remittances. Expenditure is 
directed at consumption, taxes, savings and transfers abroad. The same logic is applied to receipts and 
expenditure in other rows and columns.         
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Building a CGE model usually requires undertaking several steps:  
1. Clearly define the topic of the model. This stage is very important, since other steps, such as data 
aggregation or choice of functional forms, may be subordinated to the issue of investigation. 
2. Build analytically consistent mathematical model.  
3. Chose functional forms for production, transformation, and utility functions; specify constraints. 
4. Collect data and construct consistent Social Accounting Matrix. Missing data have to be 
calibrated. 
5. Write a code in software. This usually involves software for optimizing systems of non-linear 
equations. The most widely used are GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System), GEMPACK 
(General Equilibrium Modelling PACKage), HERCULES.   
6. Benchmark simulation. The model should be consistent and reproduce the input data. 
7. Counter-factual experiments. 
There are several classifications of CGE models, based on their theoretical background, historical 
development and modelling technique.  
First, a distinction is made according to the theoretical schools of general equilibrium modelling between 
neoclassical and structuralist models. Neoclassical models, also called “Walrasian” by Thissen (1998) and 
“fundamental” by Robinson (2003), have their roots in the Walrasian model of competitive economy and 
Solow’s model of economic growth. The purpose of these models is to analyze the effect of exogenous 
shocks on optimal allocation of resources, efficiency and welfare. A distinguishing feature of these models 
is sound theoretical foundations; any attempt to step aside from the theoretical background or to add 
macro features is considered to be corrupting the model. As was argued by Willenbockel (1994) and 
Bergman (1990), neoclassical models do not try to represent actual economy, but instead try to construct 
logical framework for analyzing policy changes. In practice, neoclassical models assume full capacity 
utilization, full employment and prices determined by marginal productivity. As a result of full 
employment, adjustment is made through the reallocation of labour from unproductive sectors to 
productive ones without considerable change in output. According to Robinson (2003), during the last 
decade neoclassical models have tended to shift away from strict theoretical regulations and include macro 
features.    
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Another type of CGE models, is the structuralist model, originating from the work of Keynes (1936), 
Kaldor (1957), Kalecki (1971) and lately analyzed by Taylor(1990, 1991). The prime idea of these models 
is to capture institutional specifics of the economy under consideration. In contrast to neoclassical models 
which focus on resource allocation, structuralist models aim to study income distribution, sectoral growth, 
trade balance changes, etc. This branch of models may use ad-hoc estimates and trade off theoretical 
strictness for empirical relevance. According to Taylor (1991), structuralist models share some common 
features: Economic actors, such as state, enterprises, and workers are not price takers and can influence 
prices or quantity changes. There is no assumption of full employment or full capital utilization. The 
money supply is often endogenous and adjusts to the level of output.  
Second, models vary depending on closure rule – the decision on which variables are endogenous and 
which are exogenous (this concept was first introduced by Sen (1963)). Some of the most widespread 
closures, listed by Kraev (2003) are the following: 
Neoclassical closure assumes that investment is equalized with savings at a level that guarantees full 
employment. This rule is fundamental for neoclassical models, but rarely used in structuralist models.  
In neo-Keynesian closure nominal wages are fixed. This closure is based on the forced saving model by 
Kaldor. The price level adjusts to bring a balance between savings and investment through a change in 
income distribution.  
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The Kaleckian closure keeps returns to labour constant, and share of wages in output is fixed. If the 
economy reaches full capacity, closure is switched to a forced savings one. 
Loanable funds closure proposes that investment is negatively related to the interest rate, whilst savings 
are positively related; the interest rate is a balancing variable here. 
Pigou/real balance closure assumes that the savings ratio depends on real money supply (the ratio of 
money supply to the price level). Money supply is exogenous and price level adjusts to bring equilibrium. 
Thissen (1998) suggests one more classification according to the determination of the parameters of the 
model: by calibration or by econometric technique. The vast majority of CGE models use calibration in 
order to determine parameters. The econometric method was initiated by Jorgenson (1984); in his study he 
built a general equilibrium model with stochastically specified submodels. Among the advantages of 
calibration is the relative simplicity of finding the parameters’ values. Few data are needed and one set of 
observations can be used. Calibration uses data for only one period of time, which can be both, an 
advantage and a disadvantage. In case the economy experiences significant changes in its structure, the 
calibration method is superior to the econometric one. Econometrics use data for several years, which may 
not be similar to the year of consideration, while calibration is done with the same data as used in the 
model. At the same time, if no considerable structural changes have taken place, econometrics can give 
better estimates. Besides that, econometric models incorporate stochastic disturbances in order to capture 
the effect of omitted variables and errors, while calibration assumes that this stochastic disturbances term 
is zero and does not include this information. Finally, econometric models give indicators of accuracy of 
determined variables, while calibration does not give information on reliability of parameters. 
Like any modelling method, General Equilibrium has its advantages and disadvantages; a discussion of 
the main ones following the study of Borges (1986) is given below. 
Probably the most prominent advantage of CGE models is their solid microeconomic foundation. General 
Equilibrium models specify the behaviour of agents using standard theoretical approaches to optimization 
and choice, hence receiving the name “theory with numbers”.  
Another strength related to theoretical foundation, is the internal consistency of CGE models. These 
models capture circular income flow in the economy and include all key agents. Then, the behaviour of all 
agents is systematized and should reach equilibrium in a benchmark scenario. Missing information or 
inconsistency would be instantly detected. 
The possibility of keeping complex interrelations transparent allows having a high degree of data 
disaggregation and takes into account linkages between different economic agents and sub-agents. Such a 
feature makes CGE models extremely useful for analysis of complicated policy issues and, as mentioned 
above, the tool is widely applied for this purpose. CGE models are particularly helpful for studies of 
structural changes in a given economy: although the total effect of external shock could be relatively small, 
structural changes can be significant. 
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A major weakness of CGE methodology is its dependence on choice of model type, functional forms, and 
parameter specifications. The results of the model can vary: if for example the Cobb-Douglas function is 
used instead of Constant Elasticity of Substitution, calibration is made with data, which are not inherent to 
the economy under consideration, or the modeller makes a wrong guess about closure rule.  
The assumption of general equilibrium, which is rarely observed in the real world, has its drawbacks as 
well. First of all, this implies that CGE models do not actually forecast reality, but rather show long-term 
tendencies in the economy. This limits the usage of CGE models and excludes the possibility of checking 
the historical development and validity of the model. Second, it does not allow the simulation of some 
policy decisions. In certain cases, the economy is not in equilibrium and problems such as a stabilization 
policy can not be modelled by CGE. 
CGE models show the long-term consequences of external shock and demonstrate results as if an 
economy immediately adjusts to it. Thus, CGE methodology is not useful for studying the adjustment 
process and costs associated with it, although for some policy decisions transition is very crucial and even 
may be more important than long-term equilibrium.           
Accession to the WTO: Part I
82 
Methodology of Research
3.2. Modelling GATT/WTO with CGE 
The first widespread application of CGE models for studying GATT/WTO issues was modelling different 
aspects of the Uruguay Round. This Round was launched in 1986, lasted more than seven years and 
resulted in the creation of the WTO. Beyond the traditional GATT topic of trade in goods, the WTO 
included much broader issues, such as trade in services, intellectual property, Dispute Settlement, Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism. Some of the CGE studies of the Uruguay Round are described in Table 3.1.  
Publications Data/ 
Evaluation
Model Structure Sectors Liberalized Results
Brown, 
Deardoff, Fox 
and Stern 
(1996)  
Data and 
evaluation at 
1990 
 Michigan model  
 29 sectors  
 8 regions 
 Perfect 
competition, CRS, 
Armington 
elasticities in 
agriculture  
 Monopolistic 
competition and 
IRS in 
manufacturing 
 Static 
 Industrial tariffs 
cut according to 
schedule. Multi-
Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) not 
covered. 
 Agriculture tariffs 
including NTB-
equivalents cut 
according to 
commitments 
 Services: NTBs 
cut by 25 per cent 
 GDP growth: USA 
0.9%, EU 0.9%, Japan 
1.4%, Australia and 
New Zealand 3.6%, 
Mexico 2.8%, 
emerging Asian 
countries 3.6%, ROW 
1% 
Francois, Mc 
Donald and 
Nordstrom
(1996) 
Data version 
1992 
 GTAP model 
 19 sectors 
 13 regions 
 Model 1: CRS, 
perfect 
competition 
 Model 2: IRS, 
monopolistic 
competition 
 Dynamic model 
 Industrial tariffs cut 
according to 
schedules, MFA 
quotas lifted  
 Agriculture tariff 
cuts according to 
commitment, 
subsidies cut by 
36% and 24% in 
developed and 
developing 
countries 
respectively
 GDP growth: World 
0.45% (Model 1) 0.9% 
(Model 2) USA 0.6%, 
EU 0.5%, Japan 0.4%, 
Australia and New 
Zealand 0.9%, Latin 
America 1.9%, East-
South Asia 1.8%  
 Decomposition of 
welfare effect: 10% 
from agriculture, 50% 
textile and clothing, 
40% other 
manufacturing 
 Trade growth: 
increase by 6% 
(Model 1), 
approximately 15% 
(Model 2) 
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Goldin and 
van der 
Mensbrugghe 
(1996)  
Data 1985-
93 
Projections 
are made for 
the period 
1993-2002 
 RUNS model 
 20 sectors (15 of 
which agricultural 
sectors)  
 22 countries  
 Perfect 
competition 
 Static 
 Industrial tariffs 
cut according to 
schedules 
 Agricultural 
reforms: tariffs 
including NTBs 
cut according to 
schedules. 
Subsidies cut by 
36% in OECD 
and 24% in other 
countries 
 GDP growth: USA 
0.1%, EU 0.6%, Japan 
0.4%, Australia and 
New Zealand 0.1%, 
Upper Income Asia 
1.3%
 Decomposition of 
welfare effect: 85% 
per cent from 
agriculture 
Hertel, Martin, 
Yanagishima 
and 
Dimaranan 
(1996) 
Data 1992, 
Evaluation 
2005 
 GTAP model 
 10 sectors 
 15 regions 
 CRS, perfect 
competition, 
Armington trade 
elasticities 
 Industrial and 
agricultural tariffs 
cut according to 
schedules. MFA 
quotas are lifted. 
 GDP growth: World 
0.89%, USA and 
Canada 0.4%, EU 
0.7%, Japan 1.04%, 
Latin America 3.8% 
 Trade growth: World 
59%, USA and 
Canada 48%, EU 
42%, Japan 22% 
 Decomposition of 
welfare effect: 
agriculture 5%, 
industrial tariff 81%, 
MFA 14% 
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Harrison,
Rutherford 
and Tarr 
(1995) 
1992 data 
and 
evaluation 
 GTAP model 
 22 sectors 
 24 regions 
 Model 1: CRT, 
perfect 
competition, 
Armington 
 Model 2: IRT, 
monopolistic 
competition 
intraregional, 
Armington-based 
trade 
 Model 1 both 
static and 
dynamic 
 Industrial and 
Agriculture tariff 
cut according to 
schedule 
 Export (domestic) 
subsidies cut by 
36% (20%) and 
24% (13%) in 
developed and 
developing 
countries 
respectively  
 GDP growth: World 
0.4% (Model 1 static), 
0.7% (Model 1 
dynamic), 0.42% 
(Model 2 static)  
 Model 1 regional 
results: US 0.4%, EU 
0.7%, Japan 0.7%, 
Latin America 1.7%, 
South-East Asia 2.5%  
 Decomposition of 
welfare effect: Model 1 
static: agriculture 68%, 
industrial tariff 18%, 
MFA 15%  
 Model 1 dynamic: 
agriculture 38%, 
industrial tariff 49%, 
MFA 12%  
 Model 2 static: 
agriculture 61%, 
industrial tariff 23%, 
MFA 17% 
Table 3.1 CGE Studies of Uruguay Round
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There are differences in the simulation results of different models, and Piermartini and Teh (2005) 
proposed the following explanation for such discrepancies: first of all, different models studied different 
aspects of the Uruguay Round. Some scrutinized general issues, while some focused on specific parts of 
the Uruguay Round. Hence, the Rural Urban North South (RUNS) model looked at agriculture, and 15 out 
of 20 sectors included in this model were agricultural ones. Another factor is the degree of regional 
aggregation. For instance, results differ, depending on whether sub-Saharan Africa was included in the 
simulation of agricultural reform or not. Model specifications had an important influence on results as 
well. A key difference across the models is the assumption about market structure. Some models assume 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale, while others assume imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale. Finally, models have different results owing to the assumption about dynamics. 
Models with fixed capital have lower estimates than those which allow for capital accumulation. 
The second large wave of modelling GATT/WTO issues was directed at the Doha Round. It was launched 
at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001 and concerns a wide range of issues, 
especially those of importance for developing countries thus it is called the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA). Table A.3 presents some of the studies. Welfare gains differ across models as well and range from 
USD 170 bn in the OECD model to over USD 2000 bn in the outlying model of Brown, Deardoff and 
Stern, but tend to predict approximately USD 250 bn gains on average. According to Piermartini and Teh 
(2005), there are five factors influencing results: baseline data and level of protection; assumption about 
nature of the models (whether they assume perfect or imperfect competition); assumption about dynamics; 
the depth of liberalization (full or partial); and scope of liberalization (whether services and trade 
facilitation are included or not).       
A large number of CGE studies was devoted to examining individual countries in the context of 
GATT/WTO, in particular accession to this organization. Probably the greatest efforts of the modellers 
were directed at examining China’s accession to the WTO. Studies were carried out with the help of 
global trade models, such as GTAP, by Yang (1996) and Hertel (1997), G-CUBED World Model by 
McKibbin and Tang (1998), PRCGEM by Fan and Zheng (2000), Mai et al. (2003), Mayes and Wang 
(2003) as well as other purpose-built models, such as those of Wang and Li (1998), Zhai and Li (2000), 
Walsmley et al. (2006). Results differ significantly from 0.5% of GDP growth to more than 10% of GDP 
growth. This is explained by a wide variety of scenarios and assumptions. 
Several models have studied WTO accession of post-USSR transition countries, a description of these is 
given below. 
Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004a) studied the economy-wide and sector-specific effects of Russia’s 
accession to the WTO.  
There are 35 sectors in the model. The underlying input-output table is for 1995 and originally had 22 
sectors but was disaggregated. Primary factors of production in all sectors are: unskilled labour, skilled 
labour and capital. There are three types of sectors: competitive, imperfectly competitive goods sectors 
and imperfectly competitive business services sectors. 
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The authors argue that there are four major sources of gains of Russia’s membership in the WTO: 
1. Improved market access. For metallurgy and chemicals it is assumed to be 1.5% increase in 
market access, for light and food industry 0.5%.   
2. Import tariff reduction. Tariffs are reduced by 50%. 
3. Liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in services. The authors estimate that ad 
valorem equivalence of barriers to foreign direct investment is 90% for air transportation, 95% for 
maritime transportation and 33% for other sectors.  
4. Improvement of the investment climate, which is modelled by an increase of capital stock. 
Estimated total gains from WTO accession are 7.2% of consumption or 3.3% of GDP in the medium run; 
liberalization of FDI is the most important source of gains. 
This model served as a basis for several more specific applications studying Russia’s accession to the 
WTO, namely: detailed model of liberalization of barriers against FDI in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2004b); telecommunications reform within Russia’s accession in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004c); 
the poverty effect of accession with very detailed decomposition of households in Rutherford, Tarr and 
Shepotylo (2005); the regional impact of accession in Rutherford and Tarr (2006).  
Jensen and Tarr (2007) have built a model for Kazakhstan. The model has 56 sectors, uses 2003 input-
output table and is similar to that of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004a). Sectors are either competitive or 
subject to increasing returns to scale. 
Scenarios are as follows: 
1. Improved market access. Market access is improved by 1.5% for basic metals and 1% for metals. 
2. Import tariff reduction. This is modelled by decreasing tariffs by 50%. 
3. Reduction in barriers against multinational service providers. Discriminatory tax for 
multinationals is decreased by 50%. 
4. Elimination of local content policies in the oil sector and simultaneous exemption of the VAT for 
multinational oil company purchases of Kazakhstan inputs. Multinationals are obliged to buy 
some inputs locally. To model elimination of this policy, local input prices are increased by 20%.  
5. Improvement of investment climate. This is modelled by an increase of capital stock. 
Total welfare gains to Kazakhstan are equal to 6.7% of Kazakhstan consumption or 3.7% of GDP. The 
largest gains come from a reduction in barriers against multinational service providers. 
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Pavel, Burakovsky, Selitska and Movchan (2004) constructed a model for Ukraine. It has 20 sectors; the 
input-output table is for 2001. Households are disaggregated into unskilled, skilled and highly skilled; 
there are seven trading regions: EU15, 10 new members (by 2004), Russia, other CIS, Asia, North 
America and Rest of the World. The model is static and has a perfect equilibrium structure. 
The policy experiments are as follows: 
1. Tariff reduction. New tariffs are taken from Ukraine’s official proposal to reduce tariffs according 
to the results of negotiations. 
2. Improved market access. Agricultural products will receive a 10% increase in market access to the 
EU and North America markets; steel products 5% to the same markets and chemicals 1% to all 
markets. 
3. Adjustment of domestic taxation. All direct subsidies are eliminated; direct taxes are set at 5%.     
Total gains from Ukraine’s accession to the WTO are a 3% increase of consumption, GDP increases by 
1.9%, exports and imports growing by approximately 14% each. 
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Pavel and Tochitskaya (2004) analyzed the economic impact of Belarus’ accession to the WTO. They 
built a CGE model with 23 sectors based on the 2001 input-output table. It has constant return to scale and 
perfect competition. The external sector is divided into CIS countries and all others. 
The authors take into account the dependence of Belarus’ economy on imported gas and model four sets 
of policy simulations: 
1. Increased price for gas imports by 25%. 
2. Tariff reduction. Tariffs are assumed to decrease by 60% (there is no specific information about 
Belarus’ WTO commitments). 
3. Improved market access. Exports of chemical products obtain a 10% increase of access to non-
CIS markets. 
4. Domestic tax reform. The direct taxes on all activities were set to 5%. For agriculture, a 5% direct 
subsidy was maintained. A VAT at equal tax rates without any privileges was set as the only 
indirect tax on commodities. All export taxes were reduced by 50%. 
The authors estimate that increased prices for imported gas will have a negative effect: welfare will drop 
by 1.5% of consumption and GDP will decrease by 1.2%. Nevertheless, if all scenarios of WTO accession 
are taken into account, the Belarusian economy will benefit and consumer welfare will rise by about 1.6% 
after WTO accession, and GDP will rise by 3.4%.  
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Endnotes 
                                                     
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article I 
2 Here lower subscript NT denotes “No Tariff”, WT ”With Tariff”; upper subscripts are W for “World”, 
H  for “Home” and F  for “Foreign”. 
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Table A.1. WTO Commitments of Transition Countries
Table A.1. W
TO
 C
om
m
itm
ents of Transition C
ountries 
C
ountry
Year of 
accession 
C
om
m
itm
ents concerning 
agricultural products 
C
om
m
itm
ents concerning non-
agricultural products 
Total A
ggregated M
easurem
ent 
of Support to agriculture 
Export 
agriculture 
subsidies 
Im
port tariff rate, 
%
Transition 
period 
Im
port tariff rate, 
%
Transition 
period 
Bulgaria 
1996 
34.9 
6 years 
12.6 
15 years 
5%
 of agricultural production;  
N
il since year 
2000 
M
ongolia 
1997 
18.4 
N
o 
20.0 
N
o 
10%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
Latvia 
1999 
33.6 
9 years 
9.3 
9 years 
5%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
Estonia 
1999 
17.7 
5 years 
6.6 
6 years 
5%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
Lithuania 
2001 
15.6 
8 years 
8.2 
4 years 
5%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
G
eorgia 
2000 
12.1 
5 years 
5.8 
5 years 
10%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
M
oldova 
2001 
12.4 
4 years 
5.7 
4 years 
10%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
K
yrgyzstan 
1998 
11.7 
N
o 
6.7 
7 years 
5%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
Albania 
2000 
10.6 
7 years 
6.0 
9 years 
10%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
C
roatia 
2000 
10.4 
5 years 
5.0 
5 years 
5%
 of agricultural production 
N
il 
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Table A.2. Example of Social Accounting Matrix 
Table A.2. Exam
ple of Social A
ccounting M
atrix 
 
A
ctivities 
C
om
m
odities
Factors 
Enterprises 
H
ouseholds 
G
overnm
ent 
C
apital
A
ccount 
R
O
W
 
Total 
A
ctivities 
G
ross output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total sales
C
om
m
odities
Interm
ediate 
dem
and 
 
 
 
H
ousehold 
consum
ption 
G
overnm
ent
consum
ption 
Investm
ent 
E
xports 
A
ggregate 
dem
and
Factors 
Value added 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor service 
exports 
Factor incom
e
Enterprises 
G
ross profits 
 
 
Transfers 
 
 
E
nterprise 
incom
e
H
ouseholds 
W
ages 
D
istributed 
profits
Transfers 
 
Foreign 
rem
ittances 
H
ousehold 
incom
e
G
overnm
ent 
Indirect taxes 
Tariffs 
Factor taxes 
E
nterprise taxes
D
irect taxes 
 
 
 
G
overnm
ent 
revenues
C
apital
A
ccount 
 
 
 
R
etained 
earnings 
H
ousehold 
savings 
G
overnm
ent
savings 
C
ap. trans. from
 
abroad 
S
avings
R
O
W
Im
ports
Factor service 
im
ports 
Transfers 
abroad 
Transfers 
abroad 
C
apital transfers 
abroad 
Foreign 
exchange 
paym
ents
Total 
Total costs
A
ggregate 
supply
Factor
expenditures
E
nterprise 
expenditures
H
ousehold 
expenditures
G
overnm
ent 
expenditures
Investm
ent
Foreign 
exchange
receipts
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Table A.3. CGE Studies of the Doha Round 
Table A.3. C
G
E Studies of the D
oha R
ound 
Publications
D
ata
B
aseline
M
odel D
escription
M
easures Liberalized
Sim
ulation Scenarios
Anderson, M
artin and 
van der M
ensbrugghe 
(2005) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 6 
2015, extrapolated from
 2001 
 
LIN
K
A
G
E
 m
odel 
 
25 sectors  
 
27 regions 
 
recursive 
dynam
ic m
odel 
 
C
onstant returns 
to scale and perfect 
com
petition 
 
A
griculture 
- Tariffs 
- E
xport subsidies 
- D
om
estic subsidies (cut 
by 28%
 for the U
S
, 18%
 
for N
orw
ay, 16%
 for the 
E
U
 and 10%
 for 
A
ustralia) 
 
M
anufacturing goods 
- Tariffs  
(i) elim
ination of all m
erchandise trade 
barriers over the 2005-2010 period 
(ii) a progressive reduction form
ula w
ith a 
m
arginal agricultural tariff rate reduction of 
45, 70 and 75 %
 cuts for developed 
countries; 35, 40, 50, and 60 %
 for 
developing countries for the respective 
bands. N
o cut for LD
C
s. 
(iii) adds to S
cenario (ii) the “S
ensitive 
P
roducts” option (2%
 of agricultural tariff 
lines for developed countries and 4%
  for 
developing countries, subject to just a 15%
 
cut)
(iv) adds to S
cenario (iii) a tariff cap of 
200%
 for agricultural products 
(v) add to S
cenario (ii) liberalization of non-
agricultural products (50%
 cut of bound 
rates for developed countries and 33%
 for 
developing countries) 
(vi) like (v) but developing countries also cut 
bound tariffs by 50%
  
Anderson, D
im
aranan, 
Francois, H
ertel, 
H
oekm
an and M
artin 
(2003) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 4 
2005 - extrapolated from
 1995 
S
tandard G
TA
P
 trade elasticities 
w
ere doubled given the long-term
 
nature of the sim
ulations. 
 
Standard G
TAP 
m
odel 
 
4 sectors 
 
19 regions  
 
C
onstant returns 
to scale and perfect 
com
petition  
 
Agriculture  
- Tariffs 
 
M
anufactured goods 
- Tariffs 
E
lim
ination of all tariffs in agricultural and 
m
anufactured goods 
B
row
n, D
eardorff and 
Stern (2003) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 4 
2005 - extrapolated from
 1995 
 
M
ichigan m
odel  
 
18 sectors 
 
20 regions 
Increasing returns 
and m
onopolistic 
com
petition in 
m
anufactures but 
 
A
griculture 
- D
om
estic subsidies 
- E
xport subsidies 
- Tariffs 
 
M
anufactured goods 
- Tariffs 
 
S
ervices  
(i) 33%
 reduction in agricultural tariffs, 
production and export subsidies  
(ii) 33%
 reduction in m
anufactured goods 
tariffs
(iii) 33%
 reduction in services barriers 
(iv) S
cenarios (i)+(ii)+(iii) 
(v) G
lobal free trade in agricultural and 
industrial goods and services 
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perfect com
petition 
and constant returns 
in agriculture 
- B
arriers 
C
line (2004) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 5 
1997 but agricultural tariff data is 
updated to 1998 
 
H
arrison-
R
utherford-Tarr 
m
odel 
 
22 sectors 
 
25 regions 
 
C
onstant returns 
to scale and perfect 
com
petition   
 
A
griculture 
- Tariffs 
- E
xport subsidies 
- Input subsidies 
 
M
anufacturing goods 
- Tariffs 
- Textile quotas 
C
om
plete elim
ination of tariffs applied to 
agriculture and m
anufactures, export 
subsidies and input subsidies on 
agriculture, and textile quotas 
Francois, van M
eijn 
and van Tongeren 
(2003) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 5.2 
1997 
P
rotection data is m
odified  
using tariffs in W
TO
 ID
B
 
and W
ITS
. Services barriers are 
estim
ated using a gravity equation 
 
17 sectors 
 
16 regions 
 
Increasing 
returns and 
m
onopolistic 
com
petition in 
m
anufactures but 
assum
es perfect 
com
petition and 
constant returns in 
agriculture 
 
D
ynam
ic  
 
A
griculture 
- O
E
C
D
 D
om
estic 
subsidies 
- E
xport subsidies 
- Tariffs 
 
M
anufactured goods 
- Tariffs 
 
S
ervices  
- B
arrier 
 
Trade facilitation 
(i) Linear: 50%
 reduction in agricultural and 
m
anufactured tariffs, export subsidies, 
O
E
C
D
 dom
estic support and services 
barriers. Trading costs are reduced by 1.5%
 
(ii) S
w
iss: reduction in agricultural and 
m
anufactured tariffs is based on the S
w
iss 
form
ula w
ith a coefficient of 25. 50%
 
reduction in O
E
C
D
 dom
estic support, export 
subsidies and services barriers. Trading 
costs are reduced by 1.5%
 
(iii) C
om
plete liberalization and a reduction 
in trading costs of 3%
 
O
EC
D
 (2003) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 5 
1997 but protection data 
benchm
arked to 1998 using  
data in O
E
C
D
 tariffs  
database 
 
Standard G
TAP 
m
odel w
ith perfect 
com
petition and 
constant returns to 
scale
 
10 sectors 
 
10 regions 
 
Agricultural  
- Tariffs 
 
M
anufactured goods 
- Tariffs 
 
Trade facilitation 
(i) Linear tariff reduction by all regions 
- free trade in agricultural and m
anufactured 
goods and trade facilitation 
- free trade only in m
anufactured goods and 
trade facilitation 
- 50%
 reduction in tariffs on agricultural and 
m
anufactured goods and trade facilitation 
(ii) D
ifferential participation in liberalization 
- C
uts of 100%
 and 50%
 respectively in 
m
anufactured and agricultural tariffs by 
developed countries only and trade 
facilitation 
- free trade by developed countries; 50%
 
cut by developing countries; trade 
facilitation 
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(iii) S
w
iss form
ula 
- S
w
iss form
ula coefficient of 25 and trade 
facilitation 
- S
w
iss form
ula coefficient of 15 and trade 
facilitation 
- S
w
iss form
ula coefficient of 5 and trade 
facilitation 
U
N
C
TAD
 (2003) 
G
TAP 
D
atabase
version 5 
1997 
M
odified using TR
A
IN
S
 to 
take preferences into  
account
 
Standard G
TAP 
m
odel w
ith perfect 
com
petition and 
constant returns to 
scale
 
6 sectors 
 
2 regions 
 
A
griculture 
- Tariffs 
- E
xport subsidies 
(i) 50%
 reduction in agricultural tariffs 
(ii) E
lim
ination of export subsidies in 
agriculture 
(iii) 50%
 reduction in processed agriculture 
tariffs (tariff escalation) 
